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"Few rules in our time are so well established that they may not
be called upon any day to justify their existence as means
adapted to an end "
Benjamin N. Cardozo***
INTRODUCTION
New domestic and international funds transfer statutes have been
adopted, but there is no generally accepted understanding of the purpose
of these laws even. though they govern the movement of roughly two
trillion dollars every day.2 This Article puts forth a theory of funds
transfer law, arguing that it should serve the interests of participants in
domestic and international financial markets and contribute to the growth
and development of internationally competitive financial centers.3 This
theory is articulated through an inverted pyramid consisting of funds
transfer law, funds transfer systems, clearing and settlement arrangements,
and trading activity.4 This theory represents a departure from the
traditional legal approach to financial markets, which focuses on
BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JuDIcAL PROCESS 98 (1921).
* '"'Rmds transfer' means the series of transactions, beginning With the originator's
payment order, made for the purpose of making payment to the beneficiary of the order."
U.C.C. § 4A-104(a) (1990). All citations to the U.C.C. refer to the 1990 Official Text with
Comments. The version of U.C.C. Article 4A cited to herein is the version that was approved
by the American Law Institute ("ALr') and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL") in 1989. Infonmation on state enactment is provided by
NCCUSL.
2 See infra note 6.
' See infra notes 6-35 and accompanying text.
4 See infra Figure 1, at p. 355.
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securities regulation and banking law to the exclusion of critical
commercial law matters such as fimds transfers
I. FNANcIAL MARKETS, FUNDS TRANSFER LAW,
AND THE INVERTED PYRAMID
This Article is about how and why big money moves in the world of
high finance. It highlights a relationship between wire transfer law and
financial markets that hitherto has been roundly neglected despite the fact
that two trillion dollars-half of America's gross national product-is
transferred by wire every day.' Wire transfer law is unique in that no
other law affects the movement of so much money. Remarkably,
however, there is no real jurisprudence of wire transfer law.7 Therefore,
two basic questions have yet to be addressed. What purposes should wire
transfer law serve? Does wire transfer law serve its articulated purposes?
This Article examines the theoretical and policy considerations that the
first issue presents. The second issue, which is addressed in a companion
article,8 involves a critical analysis of specific wire transfer rules and
logically follows the development of a theory in response to the first
issue.
'See infra text accompanying notes 27-30.
"Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C:.) Article 4A, U.C.C. art. 4A (1990), govens
the electronic transfer of roughly two trillion dollars of "bank credit," see infjra, every
day. ERNEsT T. PATRIKIS, THOMAS C. BAXTER, JR. & RAY K. BHAIA, WIRE ThANSFERs:
A GUIDE TO U.S. AND INTERNATioNAL LAWS GOvERNiNG FUNDS TRANsFERs 5-6 (1993)
[hereinafter PATRIM, B rA & BHAIA]. The United Nations' Model Law on
International Credit Transfers ("TN. Model Law"), see infra note 13, if enacted by
national legislatures, will govern the transfer of bank credit denominated in foreign
currencies that, in dollar terms, will surely be staggering. Whether the U.N. Model Law
will govern dollar-denominated transfers in the United States is uncertain. Enactment of
the U.N. Model Law by Congress or state legislatures seems unlikely given the recent
widespread adoption of Article 4A.
The use of the term "bank credit" is dehlberate, because a funds transfer is most
definitely not a physical transfer of money or in any way analogous to such a transfer.
See Fairfax Leary, Jr. & Patricia B. Fry, A "Systems" Approach to Payment Modes:
Moving Toward a New Payments Code, 16 U.C.C. L.J. 283, 287 (1984).7 In 1977, Professor Scott made this declaration with respect to commercial law
generally. Hal S. Scott, The Risk Fixers, 91 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1978). This Article and
The Risk Fixers address a simil problem: the existence of a commercial statute in a
conceptual void.
' See Ra Bhala, Paying for the Deal: An Analysis of Wire Transfer Law and
Intenational Financial Market Interest Groups, 42 KAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994) (on
file with author).
1993-94]
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This Article argues that the current theoretical void should be filled
with an inverted pyramid that conceptualizes the relationship between
wire transfer law and financial markets.9 This inverted pyramid approach
recognizes a flmdamental truth. wire transfer law is important because of
its relationship to the world of high finance. It is time to explore this
relationship and consider the issues that it raises. Perhaps the best way to
understand the importance of the law is to see it through the eyes of the
primary groups that it affects: in this case, the financial players on Wall
Street and those in Tokyo, London, Singapore, and other dynamic
financial centers.
The need for a conceptual approach is further highlighted by the fact
that over forty states have adopted a new article on funds transfers"° as
part of their commercial codes. Moreover, the Federal Reserve has
promulgated a new funds transfer regulation," the Clearing House
Interbank Payments System ("CHIPS") of the New York Clearing House
Association ("NYCHA") has adopted new funds transfer rules and
administrative procedures, 2 and the United Nations has published a new
Model Law on International Credit Transfers ("U.N. Model Law"). 3
Yet, the simple puzzle remains: Why and to whom is funds transfer law
important?14
"See infra Figure 1, at p. 355.
10 The term "funds transfers" is technically preferable to "wire transfers." "Funds
transfers" correctly suggests that payment orders may be transmitted electronically, orally,
or in writing. U.C.C. § 4A-104 cmt. 6 (1990). It is legally incorrect to think of a funds
transfer as '!money moving through a pipeline." A funds transfer is a transfer of bank
credit from one account to another. The account holder has a non-possessory personal
property interest, or chose in action, in the bank account.
n Federal Reserve Regulation 1, 12 C.F.R. pt. 210, subpt. B (1993). "Fedwire" is the
funds transfer network owned and operated by Federal Reserve Banks. See 12 C.F.R. §
210.26(e) (1993) (defining "Fedwire").
12 NEw YORK CLEARING HOUSE ASS'N, RULES GOVERNING THE CLEARING HousE
INTERBANK PAYMENTS SYSTEM (Aug. 17, 1992); NEw YORK CLEARING HOUSE As'N,
ADMINSTRATNVE PROCEDURES: CLEARING HOUSE INTERBANK PAYMENTS SYSTEM
(CHIPS) (Aug 17, 1992) [hereinafter collectively CHIPS RULES]. CHIPS is owned and
operated by the New York Clearing House Association ('CNYCHA"). See id.; NEW YORK
CLEARING HOUSE ASS'N, CONSTrruTIoN OF TEE N.Y. CLEARING HOUSE ASS'N art I. One
hundred and twenty-two financial institutions, both U.S. and foreign, are CHIPS members
or "participants." PATRIKIS, BAXTER & BHALA, supra note 6, at 194. CHIPS and Fedwire
are the nation's two principal funds transfer systems in terms of transaction number and
amount and total dollar volume. See Id. at 5-6.
'
3 MODEL LAW ON INT'L CREDIT TRANSFERS, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 17,
Annex 1, at 48, U.N. Doc. A/47/17 (1992) [hereinafter U.N. MODEL LAW].14 This is not the first time that a dearth of theory in the history of payments law has
[Vol 82
WIRE TRANSFER LAW
The resolution of this puzzle rests on the understanding that theprincipal importance offunds transfr law is its relationship to financial
market activity.5 Hence, the underlying aim of this Article is to address
the need to identify, define, and examine this relationship.
The new narrow and technical body of statutory funds transfer law
serves, or should serve, a critical macroeconomic purpose: supporting
growth and development in domestic and international financial markets.
The financial markets in question are those for (1) foreign exchange,' 6 (2)
short-term money-market instruments,17 (3) corporate equity and debt
securities, 18 (4) derivative products, and (5) interbank borrowing and
existed. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Edward Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for
Consumer Payments, 66 TEX L. REV. 63, 64, 66 (1987) (providing a microeconomic
basis for the loss allocation rules in Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C.). Nonetheless, other
theories have been based on the U.C.C. alone. Id Most commercial lawyers appreciate
the larger context in which the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits
("UCP") operates: the UCP supports the international trade of goods because letters of
credit are the primary payments and credit device in such trade. See INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBEm OF CoMERcE PUB. No. 400 (1983); ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATION-
AL PRIVATE TRADE 101-44 (2d ed. 1989). Anew revision ofthe UCPis scheduled to take
effect in 1994. Similarly, federal legislation on credit cards and the recent revisions of
U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4 are noteworthy because credit cards and checks are significant
payments methods for consumer goods. But, even the veteran commercial lawyer is likely
to pause when the issue moves to electronic funds transfers.
" As those familiar with the format of payment orders are aware, there is no place
in the format (including the third party information field) in which to specify the purpose
of the funds transfer (e.g., whether it is intended to discharge an obligation arising from
a financial or commercial tasaction). However, various studies as well as anecdotal
evidence clearly point to the critical, direct relationship between financial market activity
and the use of funds transfers. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
6 This is a twenty-four hour, international market for trading national currencies. See
generally RuDi WwEaLER, How THE FOREIGN EXCCHANGE MARKEr WORKS (1990)
(discussing the history and mechanics of the foreign exchange market, currency crises,
and trading practices and strategies).
" The "short-term money market" is a generic term for the interbank market in
several distinct, short-term instruments, including U.S. Treasury bills (short-term debt
issued at a discount and redeemed at face value), short-term government agency securities
(e.g., discount notes issued by the Federal National Mortgage Association), commercial
paper (promissory notes issued at a discount and redeemed at par value, or paying a fixed
interest rate), and repurchase agreements or "repos" (the temporary sale of securities
subject to an agreement of repurchase where the difference between the sale and
repurchase prices yields a set interest rate). See FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., A POCKET
GuIDE TO SEIEt) SHORT-TERM INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET (1987).
Is In other words, the markets for the equity and debt of private issuers.
"[A] derivative is a financial contract whose value depends on the values of one
or more underlying assets or indexes of asset values." BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
1993-94]
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lending.20 These are enormously significant markets in terms of size. The
foreign exchange market, for example, is the world's largest financial
market.2' These markets also have significant policy implications. For
instance, interbank borrowing and lending allow depository institutions
to meet Federal regulatory reserve requirements and shed excess
reserves.
In highlighting the relationship between funds transfer law and
international and domestic financial market interests, this Article rejects
three alternative arguments concerning the purpose of funds transfer law:
(1) the backstop argument, in which the law is viewed as a safety net for
private agreements. 3 (2) the argument that the law is a response to and
a cure for unfavorable common law developments;24 and (3) the argument
that consumer protection is the underlying aim of the law. Each of these
arguments is defective in its own right, and none of them accounts for the
inextricable link between financial market deals and the use of funds
transfers to settle the payment obligations generated by these deals'
FED. RESE VE SYSTE, FEDERAL DEPOsrr INs. CoRP., & OFCE OF THE COMPTROLLm
OF THE CURRENCY, DERIVATIvE PRODUCT AcnvmEs OF COMMERCiAL BANKS 1 (Jan.
27, 1993) (joint study conducted in response to questions posed by Senator Riegle on
derivative products) [hereinafter JOINT DERIVATIVES STUDY]. Derivative instruments
include futures, options, and swaps. See id., app. I, at 5, 8, 10.
' A principal form of interbank lending is the purchase and sale of Federal funds
("Fed funds") and repurchase agreements ('repos"). Fed funds refers to the market "in
which commercial banks borrow and lend excess reserve balances held at the Federal
Reserve" Charles M. Lucas et al., Federal Funds and Repurchase Agreements, in
FINANCrAL MnK: INSTRUMEm AND CONCEPTS 9-10 (John R. Brick et al eds., 2d
ed. 1986). Borrowing Fed funds is referred to as a"purchase" of Fed funds, while lending
is referred to as a "sale." There is some redundancy in using the terms "short-term money
markt instruments" and "interbank borrowing and lending" because Fed funds and repos
are short-term instruments and the subject of interbank lending.
21 J. ORIN GRABBE, INTNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARK 65 (2d ed. 1991).
' These requirements are imposed under Federal Reserve Regulation D, 12 C.F.R.
pt. 204 (1993).
" See infra notes 48-66 and accompanying text
See infra notes 67-91 and accompanying text
25 See inffra notes 92-111 and accompanying text
Confusion sometimes exists because of the seemingly synonymous use of the terms
"payment obligation!' (or "paymenf), "settlement obligation' (or "settlemenf), and
"discharge." The distinctions among these terms are not clearly drawn in either U.C.C.
Article 4A or the U.N. Model Law. The payment obligation refers to the obligation of the
originator to pay the beneficiary and is based on the underlying contract between those
two parties-a purchase of commercial paper. When the obligation is satisfied, it is legally
discharged. U.C.C. § 4A-406 (1990). In contrast, settlement obligations refer more
specifically to interbank payment obligations-the obligation of a bank that sends a
[Vol 82
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The relationship between fimds transfer law and financial markets has
not yet received any scholarly attention. There have, however, been two
parallel discussions. One discussion focuses on securities regulation,
banking law, and, to a lesser extent, commodity law and explores the
importance of these legal regimes to financial market development2 The
second discussion focuses on funds transfer law in a vacuum. Although
the literature largely explains the rules, the principles and policies that
animate the law are not related to the larger issue of financial market
development. At best, they are seen as responding to problems raised
by the common law.3
It is time for the two lines of thought to intersect and to explore the
role that payments law, specifically funds transfer law, can play in the
growth and development of internationally competitive financial markets.
With financial markets rising from Shanghai to Istanbul, this issue is
particularly timely. Put bluntly, when policy advisors from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the World Bank work with Chinese leaders to
establish a modem electronic payments system, they do not simply
connect telex lines among banks. Rather, they connect fiber-optic cables
among banks and the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Critical
to the success of these emerging financial markets-and to the continued
competitiveness of the markets in New York, Tokyo, London, and the
other established financial centers-are the legal aspects of settling
payment obligations generated by financial transactions.
The argument of this Article is premised on an "interest-group
approach" to funds transfer law. Understanding why the law matters
initially requires an identification of whom the law affects and an evalua-
tion of the relationship between the aims of the affected parties and the
payment order to pay the receiving bank for that order. Id. § 4A-402.
' The focus on securities regulation and banking law is understandable because these
bodies of law bear an obvious relation to financial markets. Ironically, though, much of
the writing along this line is by bankers and economists, not lawyers. See, e.g., HEFvL
DE CARMOY, GLOBAL BANKING STRATEGY: FINANCIAL MARKErs AND INDUSTRIAL
DECAY 58-92 (1990); RoY C. SMITH, THE GLOBAL BANKERS 191-222, 247-53, 351-80
(1989); RICHARD 0'BRIEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: TaE END OF GEOGRAPHY
17-28 (1992).
" See generally PATRDIUS, BAXIER & BHALA, supra note 6 (discussing laws that
govern funds transfers).
' There has been some work on the relationship of flmds transfer law to other bodies
of law. See, for example, Thomas Baxter & Raj Bhala, The Interrelationsh'p ofAflide
4A with Other Law, 45 Bus. LAW. 1485 (1990).
" See infra notes 48-111 and accompanying text.
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operation of the law. Within the community of commercial and invest-
ment banks that dominate the markets for foreign exchange, short-term
instruments, corporate securities, derivative products, and interbank
lending, three specific interest groups must be recognized: (1) traders, (2)
settlements departments in the financial institutions, and (3) funds transfer
systems employed by these institutions.31 Funds transfer law must be seen
primarily through the eyes of the traders who monitor Reuters screens for
movements in exchange rates, interest rates, and securities prices. The
split-second decisions of these traders to buy and sell foreign currencies,
short-term money market instruments, equity and debt securities, and
derivative instruments give rise to the payment obligations that are
candidates for settlement through funds transfers. The traders' settlements
departments, or back offices, must then execute their payment imstruc-
tions. If a funds transfer is the vehicle to transfer bank credit then a
funds transfer system must be used by the back offices. Funds transfer
law will better serve its macroeconomic purpose if it meets the interests
of these three parties.
The four-level inverted pyramid presented in Figure 1 is the
conceptual device for addressing the relationship between flnds transfer
law and financial markets.2 This is done by identifying relevant groups,
delineating their interests with respect to funds transfer law, and placing
the interest groups in a relational context. Funds transfer law is the base
of the inverted pyramid that should support funds transfer systems,
clearing and settlement operations, and, ultimately, financial market
transactions.
31 Those concerned about the role of commercial banks in this scheme should
immediately recognize that they populate each of the three interest groups. Traders and
settlements clerks are employed by commercial banks, and commercial banks participate
in funds transfer systems.
' See infra notes 112-209 and accompanying text (discussing Figure 1 in detail). One
might question why the metaphor of an inverted pyramid, as opposed to a conventional
upright pyramid, is appropriate, especially given that the narrow base of an inverted
pyramid is less stable than the broad base of an upright pyramid However, the narrow
base and the increasingly broad body of an inverted pyramid serve an important
conceptual purpose by illustrating that funds transfer law-a rather narrow and technical
body of commercial law-supports a vast array of trading activities, clearing and
settlement operations, and funds transfer systems. The use of an inverted pyramid further
highlights an important and potential soumce of instability in the system: changes in
certain provisions of funds transfer law could have deleterious effects on the financial
markets.
[Vol. 82
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Figure 1: The Inverted Pyamid
Top Level: TRADING ACTIVITIES.
Key players:
Tradings in the foreign exchange, securities, and money markets.
Key interests with respect to funds transfer law-
High speed and low cost.
Second Level: CLEARING AND
SETTLEMENT OPERATIONS.
Key players:
Settlements department of trading institution (the "back office").
Key interests with respect to funds transfer law.
Certainty as to payment order processing, mishaps, fraud, payment
finality, and discharge.
Third Level: FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS.
Key players:
Institutions participating in the system and bank regulators.
Key interests with respect to funds transfer law:
Ability to vary statute by agreement and accommodation of
systemic risk reduction efforts.
Base: FUNDS TRANSFER LAW.
Rules responsive to traders:
Same-day execution and consequential
damage preclusion.
Rules responsive to settlements departments:
Reliance on an account number in processing
payment orders, money-back guarantee,
security procedures, reever finality, and
dischrge.
Rules responsive to funds transfer systems:
Variation by agreement, choice of law,
excmtions to receiver finality.
The inverted pyramid places the players in a relational context
relative to each other and to finds transfer law and identifies their
interests. The reason for identifying the interests of the key players at the
KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL
top three levels is that these interests must be met by a funds transfer
statute if the law is to serve its macroeconomic purpose. The jurispru-
dence of funds transfer law is grounded on identifying and satisfying the
interests of the financial traders, settlements departments, and funds
transfer systems. One qualification that should be made at the outset is
that some of the interests of the players and the funds transfer rules
responsive to them may be complimentary. For example, the inverted
pyramid indicates that traders are interested in high speed and low cost
and that the same-day execution rule and the consequential damage
preclusion help satisfy these interests. This identification of the traders'
interests does not imply that the settlements department lacks any interest
in high speed or low cost or that it does not benefit from these
rules-indeed, the contrary is quite likely the case. Rather, the point is to
theorize about the primary interests and most salient responsive rules with
respect to each group.
The remainder of this Article argues that a wire transfer law must
satisfy the interests it is designed to serve. Through a hypothetical
transaction, Part II briefly explains that paper-based methods of payment
are ill-suited to the modem financial marketplace and thereby emphasizes
the importance of funds transfers to the settlement of financial transac-
tions. 3 Part III critically analyzes and rejects three theoretical positions
that are potential alternatives to the argument of this Article.' Part IV
explores in detail the relationship .between funds transfer law and
financial market activity through the inverted pyramid.35
11. CHECKS WON'T WORK
The transactions at the top of the inverted pyramid could not occur
or would be significantly impeded without high speed, low cost, and high
security funds transfers. The typical user of funds transfer services differs
markedly from the average drawer of a check. Funds transfers users are
likely to be large financial institutions and corporations engaging in
sophisticated financial deals. Their interests are distinct from those of the
individual who draws a check to pay for a retail or small business
transaction. In turn, the principles and policies that inform funds transfer
law are different from those that pertain to retail payments.
See infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 45-111 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 112-209 and accompanying text.
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Consider a spot U.S. dollar-Malaysian ringgi ' foreign exchange deal
in which a trader at Citibank ("Citi") in New York sells ten million
dollars to a trader at Hongkong Shanghai Bank ("HKSB") in Kuala
Lumpur in return for the appropriate amount of ringgit, as determined by
the prevailing market exchange rate. Assume the Citi trader pays for the
ringgit by mailing a check for ten million dollars drawn on Chemical
Bank ("Chemical") in New York, the payor bank." A security risk
exists in this situation because the check could be lost or stolen in the
mails. Suppose that after approximately ten days, the HKSB trader
receives and deposits the check in a depositary bank,' Bank Bumiputra
('Bank Bumi") in Kuala Lumpur. Bank Bumi does not give the HKSB
trader a final credit of ten million dollars, because Chemical, the paying
bank, might dishonor the check upon presentment 9 Instead, Bank Bumi
forwards the check for collection to its correspondent, perhaps the Bank
of America's office in Kuala Lumpur ("BA"), which acts as a collecting
bank.4 This adds still a few more days to the process. When Chemical
finally receives the check from BA, it examines the amount of the check
relative to the fuinds available in Citi's correspondent account and will
dishonor the draft if there are insufficient funds in Citi's correspondent
account (or if Chemical is unwilling to grant Citi an overdraft).4! ' If
Chemical honors the check, then Bank Bumi will give a final credit to the
HKSB trader's account. Any provisional credit given by Chemical to
BA or by BA to Bank Bumi generates float thus allowing the bank with
the credit (but not the HKSB trader) to earn interest on the ten million
dollars. As the days go by and float accumulates, the HKSB trader may
miss profitable investment opportunities because of the lack of a final
credit of ten million dollars.
m A "ringgit" is a Malaysian curncy. A spot foreign exchange contract involves
a commitment by one party to deliver a specified quantity of one currency against the
other party's delivery of a specified quantity of a second currency, generally within two
business days of the date of the contract.
37 U.C.C. § 4-105(3) (1990).
3, Assuming that the U.C.C. is applicable to the events in Kuala Lumpur, U.C.C. §
4-105(1) (1990) defines the term "bank." Bank Bumi also is a "collecting bank." Id. § 4-
105(5).
39Id. § 3-501(a), (b)(1).
40 Id. § 4-105(5).
41 More technically, Chemical detemines whether the check is 'properly payable."
Id. § 4-401(a).
2 Assuming that the U.C.C. applies, the final credit to HKSB'saccourt would result
when provisional credits in the check collection chain firm up and become final. Id. §§
4-301, 4-302.
1993-94]
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The laborious and risky process associated with collecting cross-
border, paper-based payment instruments is equally apparent if the
transaction is changed from a spot foreign exchange deal to a purchase
of stock. Suppose that the Merrill Lynch Dragon Fund ("Dragon Fund"),
a mutual fund dedicated to investing in Far East equities, elects to
purchase shares of the Tiger Beer Company ("Tiger"), a Malaysian
brewery whose stock is listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange.!3
Assume that Dragon Fund purchases the stock through a broker employed
by Kim Eng Securities ("KES") in Kuala Lumpur. Dragon Fund pays the
broker in Malaysian ringgit (the currency in which the Tiger shares are
quoted on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) with an international bank
draft." Accordingly, Dragon Fund asks its bank, Chemical Bank
("Chemical"), to draw a draft in ringgit. Chemical draws the draft on a
bank in Kuala Lumpur at which Chemical maintains a correspondent
account denominated in ringgit. Dragon Fund purchases the draft from
Chemical and mails it to the KES broker. The broker then deposits the
check in its bank for collection against Chemical. When the broker
obtains a final credit depends upon the time required for collection. As
in the first hypothetical, this process takes several days and entails a
security problem associated with the mails.
A funds transfer cures these difficulties and makes transactions such
as those above far more feasible than would be the case if payment
obligations were settled by check or international bank draft. With a
funds transfer system, the Citi trader wires ten million dollars to the
HKSB trader, resulting in a final credit within one or two business days.
Similarly, using a Malaysian wire transfer system, the Dragon Fund wires
ringgit to the KES broker, leading to a quick and final payment. The
features of certainty and celerity are inherent in a funds transfer but not
in a check or international bank draft. In turn, payment obligations from
the dollar/ringgit deal and the Tiger stock purchase are impractical, if not
impossible, to settle if a cross-border paper instrument entailing physical
collection is used. In the language of the economist, when otherwise
profitable transactions are inhibited, wealth is not generated and there is
a dead weight loss. In the world of high finance, time and certainty mean
money. This is not to say that financial markets would not function
4 The market capitalization of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange-a measure of the
exchange's significance-now rivals that of Singapore and is approaching that of Hong
Kong.
" An international bank draft utilizes the deposits of a domestic bank denominated
in a foreign cmrency and held in a foreign bank. JoHN DoLAN, UNiFoRM COMMECIAL
CODE: TERMS AND TRANSACIONS IN COMMERCIAL LAW § 27.2 (1991).
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without funds transfer law; clearly, they did for centuries. However, the
twenty-four-hour global financial markets for foreign exchange, money
market instruments, interbank lending, corporate securities, and derivative
products demand more than that which paper-based payment mechanisms
can provide.
I. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF FUNDS TRANSFER LAW
There are primarily three explanations of funds transfer law. Funds
transfer law could be conceived of as a "backstop" to private agree-
ments.45 However, this highlights a tension between the interests in (1)
uniformity among commercial rules and (2) encouraging parties to reach
their own solutions and thereby facilitate competitive variation among
these rules. Funds transfer law could also be seen as providing compre-
hensive, consistent rules in lieu of varied and uncertain case law.'
However, this is an ad hoc explanation that misses the critical role that
funds transfer law plays in financial marketplaces. Consumer protection
is a third possible explanation for the importance of funds transfer law
and has been the focus of many of the drafters of the U.N. Model
Law 7 Yet, focusing on consumer protection neglects the size and
sophistication of the principal users of funds transfer services-large
financial institutions and corporations. These three alternative arguments,
considered in summary fashion below, are insufficient explanations for
the purpose of funds transfer law. Still, the argument presented herein is
considerate of them and they should not be seen as wholly deficient.
A. Backstop to Private Agreements
The prefatory note to Article 4A intimates the backstop approach. In
a section entitled "Why is Article 4A needed?," the NCCUSL and ALI
indicate that "[tihere is no comprehensive body of law that defines the
rights and obligations that arise from wire transfers..... Article 4A is
intended to provide the comprehensive body of law that we do not have
today." Private agreements, including the funds transfer system rules
of Fedwire and CHIPS, provide some but not all of the necessary
governing regime. A funds transfer statute will supplement these
agreements and govern the entire funds transfer chain.
See infra notes 48-66 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 67-91 and accompanying text
47See infra notes 92-111 and accompanying text.4
, U.C.C. art. 4A Prefatory Note, at iii (1990) [hereinafter Prefatory Note].
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The NCCUSL/ALI explanation is not a rigorous answer to the
question posed in the rubric "Why is Article 4A needed?" Comprehen-
siveness, though desirable because the statute will apply from origina-
tor49 to beneficiary,50 is neither a guiding principle for drafters nor an
underlying explanation for scholars. To what end, then, should the critical
provisions of the systematic statute be directed? The statute must be
explored for a primary purpose.51
The NCCUSL/ALI explanation of the need for Article 4A is suspect
for three reasons. First, even the numerous provisions of Article 4A that
are variable by party agreement 2 are likely to be more than backstops
because the cost of contracting out of them may exceed the benefits. 3
The parties might be unable to negotiate a reallocation of their initial
legal entitlements because of prohibitively high bargaining costs. Under
the Coase Theorem, the removal of impediments to bargaining is a
necessary requirement for a mutually beneficial transaction.' The Coase
49 U.C.C. § 4A-104(c) (1990) defines "originator" as "the sender of the first payment
order in a fRnds transfer."
s A "beneficiary" is "the person to be paid by the beneficiary's bank." Id. § 4A-
103(a)(2). The "beneficiary's bank," in turn, is "the bank identified in a payment order
in which an account of the beneficiary is to be credited pursuant to the order or which
otherwise is to make payment to the beneficiary ff the order does not provide for payment
to an account." Id. § 4A-103(a)(3).
s3 Professor Scott grappled with this problem in the context of check collection law,
and he rightly refised to accept that law as nothing more than a codification of the law
merchant
My thesis is that the need to backstop private contract or to provide
"rational" ordering is not a sfficient explanation for statutory development.
Statutory commercial law rules are instead to be understood as largely
regulatory in import Some rules deal with cases where private contract actually
fails to structure risk allocation or fails to structure it efficiently. Other rules are
enacted to rid merchants and financial institutions of common law restraints on
contract or to eliminate the competition accompanying contractual freedom. Still
others may be enacted at the insistence of consumers to limit the contractual
freedom of merchants. In any case, statutory rules are principally designed to
alter rather than to "codify' the existing legal regime. They reflect concern with
the ability of various transactors, whether merchants or consumers, to protect
themselves in the marketplace, and they are ultimately distributional in
character.
Scott, supra note 7, at 738-39 (emphasis added).
'2 U.C.C. § 4A-501(a) (1990) (providing a general authorization for variation by
agreement).
3Scott, supra note 7, at 741; see infra notes 184-209 and accompanying text.
The critical assumptions of the Coase Theorem are that the parties have
substantial, relevant information and act rationally, and that there are no transaction costs.
The Coase Theorem states that allocative efficiency (the. maximum productive use of
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Theorem is applicable in that because of these impediments, a financial
transaction may not occur. Funds transfers are potentially cheaper means
of settling payment obligations than paper-based systems and, according-
ly, the Coase Theorem would suggest that, other factors being equal,
mutually beneficial financial transactions will occur where funds transfers
are used. At the same time, insofar as parties rely on the backstop rules,
they cease to fashion their own creative solutions. Thus, the rules
preclude competitive variation in risk allocation.55
Second, there is a tension between supplementing private agreements
and achieving uniformity. A funds transfer statute that serves as a
backstop to private funds transfer system agreements must contain
optional provisions or else the statute will intervene in too many issues
rather than simply supplement the agreements.' Optional provisions,
however, are at odds with the goal of achieving uniformity. Moreover,
they impede the achievement of economies of scale' in risk allocation
rules.
resources) depends not on the initial assignment of legal rights, which is only the starting
point from which negotiations begin, but rather on market values of resources. The parties
will negotiate and trade their legal entitlements based on the marginal benefit and
m cost of their respective resources. There is "bargaining room" whenever the
marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost. Hence, party A (a farmer) who is initially
assigned a legal right (to prohibit cattle raising on adjacent property) will trade it away
to party B (a rancher next door) if the value of party B'sresource (the marginal benefit
from raising a cow) exceeds the value of party A'sresource (the marginal cost of crop
damaged by the cow). Where negotiations cease, resources are allocated efficiently. Jules
Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic
Approach to Law, 68 CAL. L. REV. 221, 223-25, 236 (1980).
Whether the Coase Theorem applies to complex cases and large bargaining groups
is an open issue. See generally Elizabeth Hoffmnan & Matthew Spitzer, Experimental Tests
of the Coase Theorem with Large Bargaining Groups, 15 . LEGAL STUD. 149 (1986)
(describing the limited applicability of the Coase Theorem to bargaining situations
involving many parties).
SS Scott, supra note 7, at 776, 792.
Id. at 776.
Traditionally, "economies of scale" means that the cost per unit, or average cost,
of production declines as the total amount of output increases. Eric Rasmussen & Todd
Zenser, Diseconomies of Scale in Employment Contracts, 6 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 65, 65
(1990). If financial market players govened by a funds transfer statute exercise their right
to opt out of certain provisions, then they must negotiate alternative rules and, therefore,
incur transaction costs. The cost per funds transfer rises because of such transactions
costs; thus, the long-run average cost curve does not decrease as dramatically or become
as flat as would be the case if the parties did not opt out of the statute. This implies that
it takes a larger number of funds transfers to achieve an economy of scale.
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Third, Professor Scott's skepticism toward arguments supporting
uniform law is equally applicable to arguments in favor of a comprehen-
sive funds transfer statute: "One must be wary, however, of the argument
for uniform law. Often it is nothing more than a political ploy to protect
a statutory outcome." Banks sought to reallocate judicially-allocated
risks in drafting both the American Bankers' Association Bank Collection
Code of 192959 and Article 4A.' Much of the commentary from
commercial banks during the Article 4A drafting process concerned
limiting the liability of these banks. This typifies their interest in
reallocating risks to originators and beneficiaries."
The backstop explanation is essentially a microeconomic argument.
Under this law and economics approach, a legitimate question is why
transactors in the funds transfer marketplace cannot be relied upon to
devise a set of efficient governing rules. Indeed, if indicia of efficiency
such as high speed, low cost, and certainty are important to the players
in the inverted pyramid,' then absent a showing of market failme,
Scott, supra note 7, at 775.
Id. at 761-62.
The final drft of Article 4A was approved by the NCCUSL and ALI in June
1989, and drafling began at least as early as 1987. U.C.C. § 4A-102 cnt. (1990)
(presenting a general drafting history of Article 4A).
" See, e.g., Letter from Thomas E. Montgomery, Vice President and Assistant
General Counsel, Bank of America, to William B. Davenport, Counsel, First National
Bank of Chicago (Sept. 2, 1987) (on file with author) (suggesting that the exception to
the limitation on damages recoverable against a receiving bank for "malicious disregard
of the rights of the injured party' is too vague); Letter and Accompanying Major Issues
List from Richard M. Gottlieb, Vice President and Associate General Counsel,
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, to Robert Ballen, Esq., Morrison & Forester
(Sept. 1, 1987) (on file with author) (advocating, for instance, (1) that the entire loss from
an unauthorized transfer shift to the customer unless the customer notifies the receiving
bank of the loss within fifteen days because the burden on the receiver to prove that the
customer's delay resulted in the loss is otherwise too difficult and (2) that consequential
damage liability be limited to instances where a bank acted in "bad faith" or "malicious
disregard"); Letter from John C. Warren, Vice President and Counsel, Wachovia
Corporation, to Roland E. Brandel, Chairman, American Bar Association Ad Hoe
Committee on Payment Systems (Aug. 7, 1987) (on file with author) (criticizing the use
of a comparative fault standard in cases of unauthorized transfer orders and advocating
(1) that a customer who fails to meet notifications requirements should be liable for loss
and (2) the right of a destination bank to charge back a beneficiary's account in a failed
bank case regardless of whether such revocation is authorized in an agreement with the
beneficiary).
' See infra notes 112-209 and accompanying text.
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intervention from an external official body such as NCCUSL, the ALL
or the Federal Reserve is unlikely to lead to efficient outcomes.63
There are at least two microeconomic responses to the backstop
explanation. The first concerns the transaction costs of collective action:
"[B]argaining is not costless."'4 Although a number of commercial
banks that provide funds transfer services (as well as the Federal Reserve
and some corporations that use funds transfer services) participated in the
drafting of U.C.C. Article 4A, many financial institutions that were
affected by the new statute, such as securities firms, were not involved.
Moreover, the U.N. Model Law was drafted by official delegates
representing countries, not commercial parties. In reality, because of
economic and political barriers, not every interested party is willing or
able to represent itself at negotiation and drafting sessions.
Second, there is a matter of forecasting who the interested parties are
likely to be. The thesis that funds transfer law should serve the interests
of the financial marketplace is dynamic because that marketplace changes
at a dizzying rate. Not every financial instrument that is currently traded
is settled by funds transfer, but undoubtedly those involved in the trading
of such instrumnents may in the future seek to use funds transfers as a
means of settlement." The difficulty is in identifying a priori which
parties in which markets will most likely want to consider funds transfer
settlements. The problem is compounded by the fact that potentially
affected parties are unlikely to identify themselves at the time when the
hard work of negotiating and drafting a law must be done. Such parties
may have given the matter little thought as yet or may simply be
preoccupied with short-term trading matters. There is, in sum, imperfect
information about potential future repercussions of funds transfer law. It
falls upon the shoulders of the drafters to anticipate financial innovations
and to ensure that their product accommodates these innovations. A law
and economics approach might suggest that the task of drafting be left to
the market specifically, to the financial players that currently rely on
funds transfers. However, the task of anticipating developments regarding
future applications of funds transfer settlement is aided by the interven-
tion of additional parties that sit in a "bird's eye" position. The Federal
" For an overview of classical rationales for regulatory intervention, see STEPHEN
BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-35 (1982); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAw 367-70 (1992).
6' BREYER, supra note 63, at 24.
"See supra note 60.
6See, e.g., infra note 146 (discussing the same-day funds settlement proposal of the
National Securities Clearing Coxporaton and the Depository Trust Company).
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Reserve, legal scholars, and others can at least ensure that funds transfer
law is not drafted with only narrow, short-term interests in mind.
B. Responding to the Common Law
The prefatory note to Article 4A of the U.C.C. also suggests a second
explanation of the need for Article 4A: Article 4A is needed to respond
to uneven or unwelcome common law developments. Courts are uncertain
as to whether analogies to other payments mechanisms such as negotiable
instruments are appropriate in determining the outcome of a funds
transfer case. "The result is a great deal of uncertainty. There is no
consensus about the judicial nature of a wire transfer and consequently
of the rights and obligations that are created."
Although the pre-Article 4A common law of electronic funds
transfers highlighted issues for resolution by statute," the reliance of the
NCCUSL/ALI on the existence of these common law problems as an
explanation of the need for Article 4A is inductive and haphazard. The
broad import of Article 4A should not be inferred from narrow problems
posed by a few, pre-Article 4A cases. Such an inference forecloses the
opportunity to interpret the statutory response from the viewpoint of the
key interest groups in the inverted pyramid- the trader, her settlements
department, and the funds transfer system used by that department.
The drafipersons of Article 4A took issue with leading cases such as
Evra Corporation v. Swiss Bank Corporation,69 in which the Seventh
Circuit held that consequential damages could be awarded if a bank with
notice of particular circumstances giving rise to damages refuses to
execute a payment order.7" They manifest their disagreement with the
Evra result in the statutory provisions that bar consequential damages
unless a receiving bank expressly agrees in writing to assume such
67 Prefatory Note, supra note 48, at iii.
a See supra text accompanying note 67; infra text accompanying notes 69, 73-74.
673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982) (overruled by U.C.C.
§ 4A-305 (1990)). In Evra, the intermediary bank, see infra note 104, failed to execute
a payment order in the amount of $27,000. The intended beneficiary of the order
cancelled the originator's ship charter and the originator was forced to obtain a new ship
charter at a far higher cost. Id. at 952-53. Applying the common law test in Hadley v.
Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), that consequential damages am not
available unless the defendant is notified of special circumstances that might give rise to
them, the court found that the originator could not recover $2.1 million in lost profits
from the intermediary bank Evra Corp., 673 F.2d at 955-56.
70 U.C.C. § 4A-305 cmut. 2 (1990).
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liability." The case posed two dangers. First, other jurisdictions would
reach the same or substantially similar results, leading to the imposition
of "crushing" liability on banks, which, in turn, would harm the funds
transfer service industry.' Alternatively, other jurisdictions would reach
different results, leading to a patchwork of rules about liability that would
be unworkable for any interstate or international funds transfer. Clearly,
however, there is no need for an entirely new U.C.C. article just to handle
a limitation of damages problem.
The case of Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. 3
posed a different challenge for the draftspersons, but it also fails to shed
light on the underlying purpose of the statute. The case grew out of the
celebrated failure of a German bank, Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt, KG.a.A.
('Herstatt"), which had entered into three foreign exchange contracts with
Delbrueck & Company ("Delbmeckl'). At issue was whether an originator
(Delbmeck) of $12.5 million worth of future value CHIPS payments
messages could revoke the messages after learning that German banking
regulators had closed the intended beneficiary (Herstatt) of the finds
transfers.7' The related rules on the revocation and amendment of
' Id. § 4A-305 & cmt. 2. Consequential damages are available in one instance under
Article 4A. a beneficiary's bank accepts a payment order on behalf of a beneficiary,
refuses to pay the beneficiary, and has no reasonable doubt about the right of the
beneficiary to the finds. Id. § 4A-404(a) & cnt. 2.
A "receiving bank"' is a bank to which the instraction of a sender is addressed, the
sender being the person giving the instruction. U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(4)-(5) (1990).
' Of course, unless precluded by statute, banks are free to limit their liability for
consequential damages. Problems of characterizing "consequential damages" in the funds
transfer context do not seem severe. Banks could, for example, disclaim liability for
damages other than the prncipal amount of the transfer, interest for the applicable period,
and the cost of the transfer.
609 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1979).
4 Id. at 1049-50. A future value payment order is one whose execution date is after
the date of receipt by the receiving bank. Delbrueck issued two payment orders (or, in
CHIPS parlance, "payments messages") to the originator's bank, Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Company ("MHlT'): (1) on June 25, 1974, calling for a $12.5 million transfer on
June 26 to the Chase Manhattan Bank ("Chase"), the beneficiary's bank, for Herstatt's
account; and (2) on June 26, 1974, calling for a $10 million transfer on June 27 to Chase
for Herstatt's account. Herstatt was closed on June 26 at 10:30 am. eastern standard time.
The opinion indicates that Delbrueck's second payment message was sent "early on the
morning of June 26" but does not make clear whether this was before or after 10:30 am.
Id. at 1050. In any event on June 26 Delbrueck issued revocation orders to MiT at 11:30
a .n, 12:00 noon, and later in the afternoon. While the $10 million funds transfer due on
June 27 was stopped, the $12.5 million transfer due on June 26 was completed. On June
26, MFT executed the $12.5 million payment message at 11:36 am. (by issuing a
message to Chase for $10 million) and 11:37 am. (by issuing a message to Chase for
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payment orders and receiver finality set forth in Article 4A are important
features of the statute, but they are insufficient evidence on which to base
an inference as to the broader import of Article 4A. 5 Nonetheless,
commentators have sought to predicate the purpose of Article 4A on the
problems posed by the case7
Still another challenge posed by pre-Article 4A case law concerned
the responsibility of a beneficiary's bank with respect to a payment order
in which the name and account number of the beneficiary do not
match.' Must the bank examine each payment order received for
mismatches and, if so, what must it do with a payment order that contains
inconsistencies?'
While this brief review of some leading pre-Article 4A cases suggests
a stimulus-response relationship between pre-Article 4A common law and
certain Article 4A rules, it must be remembered that a statute has a life
beyond the facts of particular cases that arguably spawned the statute.
$2.5 million). Chase credited Herstatt's account at 9:00 pm. on June 26. Delbrueck argued
that the S12.5 million transfer was revocable until 9:00 p.m. and that MHT had acted
negligently by failing to act on the revocation orders. Looking to banking custom and
practice regarding revocability of CHIPS transfers, a modification of the CHIPS finality
rules made after the Herstatt failure, and the common law of assignment of chaoses in
action, the court held that the transfer was irrevocable. Id. at 1050-51.
' U.C.C. § 4A-211 (1990) (amendment of payment orders); id. § 4A-405 (receiver
finality). Interestingly, the facts of Delbrueck could not be repeated if the funds transfer
had been conducted through Fedwire instead of CHIPS. See 12 C.F.R. § 210.30(c) (1992).
Under the curent version of Regulation J, a Federal Reserve Bank will not accept a
payment order that calls for execution on a funds-transfer business day later than the day
of receipt. Thus, if Delbrueck had had access to Fedwire and had issued the June 25
payment order to a Reserve Bankl, the order would have been rejected. Note, however,
that an exception to the same-day execution rule may be made for future-value transfers
from foreign central bank accounts maintained at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
PATRIKS, BAXTER & BHAiA, supra note 6, at 72.
76 See, e.g., Roger Cowie, Note, Cancellation of Wire Transfers Under Article 4A of
the Uniform Commercial Code: Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.
Revisited, 70 Thx L. REV. 739, 740 (1992).
77 See generally Bradford Trust Co'. v. Texas Am. Bank-Houston, 790 F.2d 407 (5th
Cir. 1986) (holding a trust company liable for a forged wire transfer despite the fact that
the transferee was negligent in faling to notice the discrepancy); Securities Fund Servs.,
Inc. v. American Nat'lBank & Trust Co., 542 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Il. 1982) (holding that
where a collecting bank failed to notice a discrepancy, the wire transfer contemplated a
credit to the account rather than a safekeeping arrangement).
7 The statutory solution to the problem is to allow the beneficiary's bank to rely
solely on the account number. U.C.C. § 4A-207 & cmt. 2 (1990). Interestingly, the
illustrative hypothetical case in the official comment involves a wire transfer of proceeds
from the redemption of mutual fumd shares-in other words, a funds transfer generated by
a financia market transaction. Id.
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Many statutes would become obsolete very quickly if their raison d'etre
was based on early case law. The vitality of Article 4A, and funds
transfer law generally, is and will continue to be derived from the use of
funds transfers to settle payment obligations arising from domestic and
international financial transactions. Indeed, this proposition is suggested
by cases in which the facts arose before the enactment of Article 4A but
which were adjudicated thereafter."
The aforementioned cases should be seen from this financial market
perspective. For instance, the Evra court's statement that "[e]lectronic
funds transfers are not so unusual as to automatically place a bank on
notice of extraordinary consequences if such a transfer goes awry"80
should be re-evaluated in light of the fact that large-dollar financial deals
are settled by funds transfer, and several such deals are often linked in
purpose."' Every receiving bank' should know that the payment order it
receives, accepts, and executes is likely to represent settlement of a major
transaction in foreign exchange, securities, or money market instruments.
Conversely, imposing consequential damage liability on receiving banks
could raise transaction costs associated with these deals. Receiving banks
will factor the expected cost of consequential damage liability into their
funds transfer service fees, thereby insuring against the risk that such
liability will be imposed, but raising costs for senders.
9 See, e.g., Banque Worms v. BankAmerica Int'l, 570 N.E.2d 189 (N.Y. 1991)
(involving a revolving credit agreement); see also In re Koreag, Controle et Revision
SA., 961 F.2d 341, 344-45 (2d Cir. 1992) (involving transactions in foreign currency and
the application of U.C.C. Article 2, though not discussing payment obligations from such
transactions); Manufacturers Hanover Trost Co. v. Chemical Bank, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704
(App. Div. 1990) (involving a mistaken transfer to a Merrill Lynch account), appeal
denied, 569 N.E.2d 874 (N.Y. 1991). The ability to rely on opinions for this point is
limited because they tend to spend little, if any, time on the underlying transactions. Data
and reports published by central banks and the Bank for International Settlements, such
as those cited supra notes 17 and 19, infra notes 84, 98, 112, 114, 116, 146, and 164, are
more helpful in this regard.
so Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 956 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1017 (1982).
" Consider a U.S. dollar-Singapore dollar spot foreign exchange contract where
delivery of two million Singapore dollars against one million U.S. dollars is delayed. The
purchaser of the Singapore dollars is an equity broker from the Far East who is buying
shares on behalf of the broker's cient, a U.S. mutual fund, in an initial public offering on
the Singapore Stock Exchange. Because of the delayed credit of Singapore dollars to the
broker's account, the purchase of the stock may also be delayed. The broker is forced to
buy the shares at a higher price later in the secondary market The broker must, therefore,
either absorb the cost of the delayed execution or pass it on to the mutual fund.
' See supra note 71.
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The Deibrueck decision suggests that funds transfer law can mitigate,
but not wholly resolve, credit risk issues. Delbrueck chose to engage in
foreign exchange deals with a counterparty that failed, and faced what
became known as the "'Herstatt risk" problem,83 "which is one of
delivering one currency to the trading counterparty but not receiving the
amount of foreign exchange bargained for in return.8 Statutory rules on
revocation and amendment of payment orders" and receiver finality' help
define the period of credit risk exposure: Delbrueck is at risk from the
moment that its payment message becomes irrevocable until the moment
that Herstatt's payment is final. The rules, however, cannot substitute for
credit risk analysis and the establishment of position limits for trading
foreign exchange with certain counterparties. Moreover, Herstatt risk can
be reduced by structuring settlement arrangements with a counterparty of
dubious credit worthiness in a conservative fashion through use of an
escrow account."
The U.C.C. Section 4A-207 rule that a beneficiary's bank has no duty
to check for a name/number mismatch in a payment order" facilitates
rapid, non-human processing. The high speed characteristic of a funds
transfer makes it particularly desirable for foreign exchange, securities,
and money market dealers who seek rapid settlement of payment
obligations.' The statutory responses to Securities Fund Services' and
"The "Herstatt risk' problem is named after the failed bank with whom Delbrueck
had foreign exchange contracts. See Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., 609 F.2d 1047, 1049-50 (2d Cir. 1979).
" See BANK FOR INT'L S='TLEMENT (BASLE, SWrizERLAND), REPORT OF THE
CONMITEE ON INTERBANK NETiNG SCHEMES OF THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE GROUP
OF TEN COUNTIuES 2.16 (Nov. 1990) [hereinafter LAMFALUSSY REPORT, after the
Chairman of the Committee on Interbank Netting Schemes, M. A. Lamfalussy].
"U.C.C. § 4A-211 (1990); U.N. MODEL LAW art. 12 (1992).
U.C.C. § 4A-405(c).
,
7 The aim is to prevent one party from simultaneously having both the foreign
exchange and the U.S. dollars to pay for the foreign exchange. Accordingly, the U.S.
dollars can be transferred to an escrow account and released when the foreign currency
is delivered to the escrow agent.
n U.C.C. § 4A-207 (1990); U.N. MODEL LAw art. 10(4) (a comparable provision,
stating that when a beneficiary bank detects a discrepancy, it must give notice to the
sender, if identifiable).
'9 See, e.g., RICHARD B. MILLER, CmCoRP: T1 STORY OF A BANK IN CISIS 129
(1993) ("With the awesome power and speed of electronic transfers, the scope of foreign-
exchange trading is constantly increasing.').
' Securities Fund Servs., Inc. v. American Nat'lBmak & Trust Co., 542 F. Supp. 323
(N.D. M. 1982).
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Bradford Trust9 altered the common law landscape in a.way that protects
this characteristic.
C. Consumer Protection
Consumer protection is .a third candidate to compete with the
argument that the primary standard for evaluating fimds transfer law is
the extent to which it meets the needs of financial market players. As
indicated by the impractical provision on assistance 2 and the controver-
sial provision on deemed acceptance,93 a number of the delegates of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL")
sought to draft a U.N. Model Law that would be oriented to the needs
and protection of consumers. A concern for consumer protection might
also explain the potentially draconian liabilities facing a receiving bank
that fails to execute or improperly executes a payment order.' However,
consumer protection is not the basic thrust of the U.N. Model Law, which
9' Bradford Trust Co. v. Texas Arm. Bank-Houston, 790 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1986).
9 Under U.N. MODEL LAW art 13, "each receiving bank is requested to assist the
originator and each subsequent sending bank, and to seek the assistance of the next
receiving banle' to ensure that the credit transfer is complete. It may be good business
practice for a receiving bank to provide such assistance, but there should be no hint of
an obligation for the bank to investigate mishaps up and down a funds transfer chain, as
this will add to delays and costs in processing payment orders. Further, because there is
no remedy for failure to provide such assistance, a court may potentially fashion a remedy
on the ground that the provision is otherwise meaningless; and these resulting judicial
remedies may be non-uniformi. C. U.C.C. § 1-203 (imposing obligation of good faith);
id. § 4A-105(a)(6) (defining good faith).
9 ' Under U.N. MODEL LAw art. 7(2)(e), a receiving bank other than the beneficiary's
bank is deemed to have accepted a payment order when the time for giving notice of
rejection has expired. U.N. MODEL LAW art. 9(l)(b) states the same rule for a
beneficiary's bank. The U.C.C. Article 4A approach is to place a five-day time limit on
the life of a payment order, U.C.C. § 4A-210(b), and limit a receiving bank's liability for
failure to give notice of rejection to interest for this period. Id. § 4A-211(d). Passive
acceptance without liability limits fails to account for the fact that in the high-volume
world of payment order processing, a receiving bank may be sent thousands of payment
orders in a few hours. While banks with sophisticated systems should be able to
accommodate this volume, new entrants to the fRmds transfer service business may be
slower in rejecting orders. (For example, banks in certain countries take days to provide
notices of rejection.) Imposing a larger penalty may force new entrants to bring high-
speed payment order processing systems on line quickly; on the other hand, it may
discourage them from providing funds transfer services at all.
- U.N. MODEL LAW art. 18 suggests that remedies, other than those identified in
Article 17, may be available for intentional or reckless failure to execute a payment order
properly if there is actual knowledge that loss would be likely to result.
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states that "[t]his law does not deal with issues related to the protection
of consumers."95 Nor is it the essence of U.C.C. Article 4A, which clearly
provides that consumer electronic payments are governed by a different
legal regime.?6
The reason for the clear de-emphasis of consumer matters is plain. A
payment obligation satisfied through a funds transfer can arise from
virtually any sort of underlying contractual relationship between the
buyer/payor and seller/payee.97 However, it is factually erroneous to think
that consumer transactions generate the bulk of activity on Fedwire or
CHIPS. "The bulk of payment activity is concentrated in New York City
and is associated with securities trading, including transactions in
commercial paper, and foreign exchange trading."' This is not to say
that there are no tensions whatsoever in the inverted pyramid but, rather,
to point out that the principal players are large and sophisticated financial
institutions.
A subtle distinction between "consumers" and "users" is implicit in
the argument that there is more to funds transfer law than consumer
protection. "Consumer" conjures up images of individual or small
business bank account holders and related consumer protection notions,
yet they are far less likely to be originators" or beneficiaries"® than large,
sophisticated institutional investors."01 The term "user" better captures the
players affected by funds transfer law. Consequently, provisions such as
the money-back guarantee 2 can be seen as basic user protections in a
statute affecting the likes of Citibank ("Citi"), Morgan Guaranty Trust
Company ("Morgan"), Banque Nationale de Paris ("BNP"), and Dai-Ichi
Kangyo (D ").
If consumer protection were the focus of funds transfer law, then that
law would look vastly different from the U.N. Model Law or U.C.C.
U.N. MODEL LAW art. 1.
U.C.C. § 4A-108 (excluding consumer transactions that are governed by the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1978), and its implementing
regulation, Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. pt. 205 (1993)).
'7 See supra note 26.
CENTRAL BANKS OF THE GROUP OF TEN CoUiNTMs AND SwrrzERAND, BANK
FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS (BASLE, SwrrzERLAND), PAYMENT SYSTEms IN ELEVEN
DEVELOPED CoUNTRES 215 (3d ed. 1989) [hereinafter PAYMENT SYSTEMS].
"See supra note 49.
1"0 See supra note 50.
... The cost of contracting out of statutory provisions is likely to be higher for such
consumers than for sophisticated investors, thus making it more likely that those
provisions will govern.
" U.C.C. § 4A-402(c); U.N. MODEL LAW art. 14(1).
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Article 4A. For example, provisions on disclosure obligations of receiving
banks to senders, fee schedules of receiving banks, and severe limitations
on the freedom of receiving banks to contract out of obligations might
dominate the statute.' Instead, neither the U.N. Model Law nor Article
4A says anything about disclosure obligations-under those laws, a
receiving bank need not inform a sender about how the sender's payment
order will be processed, the route the funds transfer will take, the funds
transfer system that will be used, or the risks of intermediary bank'0 '
failure. Fee schedules and cut-off hours are entirely unregulated, except
by market forces. Most importantly, receiving banks are free to vary by
agreement with their senders most of the statutory provisions.'
Both the U.N. Model Law and Article 4A feature the freedom of
parties to contract out of the statute in favor of their own arrange-
ments.'" The provision of this freedom suggests a conception of users
" See, for example, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r
(1978), and Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. pt. 205 (1993), with respect to consumer electronic
payments, and the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1988), and Regulation
Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.25 (1993), with respect to credit cards.
"4 The 'bitermediary bank" is a receiving bank other than "'he originator's bank or
the beneficiary's bank." U.C.C. § 4A-104(b). The "originator's bank" is the bank to which
the payment order of the originator (the sender of the first payment order in a funds
transfer) is sent ifthe originator is an entity other than a bank. Id. § 4A-104(c)-(d). Where
the originator is a bank, the originator and the originato's bank are the same party. Id.
§ 4A-104(d)(ii).
"3' In the U.N. Model Law, the money-back guarantee cannot "be varied by agreement
except when a prudent originator's bank would not have otherwise accepted a particular
payment order because of a significant risk involved in the credit transfer." U.N. MODEL
LAW art. 14(2). With the exception of one limitation regarding agreement to a
commercially unreasonable security procedure, the interloper fraud rules are variable. Id
art. 5(3). A receiving bank cannot avoid its liability to a non-bank originator or
beneficiary. Id. art. 17(1). Similarly, in U.C.C. Article 4A, the only invariable provisions
are the money-back guarantee, U.C.C. § 4A-402(f) (1990), the right of a beneficiary to
receive payment and damages in the event of wrongful nonpayment, id. § 4A-404(c), and
the receiver finality rle. Id. § 4A-405(c). There are some limitations on the freedom to
vary the interloper fraud rules, id. § 4A-202(f), and the discharge rule can be varied only
by the agreement of the originator and beneficiary, as the rule affects only those parties.
Id. § 4A-406(d).
1 U.N. MODEL LAW art. 4 ('Except as otherwise provided in this law, the rights and
obligations of parties to a credit transfer may be varied by their agreement."); U.C.C. §
4A-501(a) ('Except as otherwise provided in this Article, the rights and obligations of a
party to a funds transfer may be varied by agreement of the affected party."). Funds
transfer system rules, as well as agreements between parties, are a second vehicle for
altering the U.C.C. Article 4A regime. Participants in the system, namely, banks, are the
beneficiary of this freedom: "Except as otherwise provided in this Article, a finds-transfer
system rule governing rights and obligations between participating banks using the system
1993-941
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and providers of funds transfer services who operate on a level playing
field rather than the classic unequal bargaining power scenario that a
consumer protection statute anticipates." 7 In the classic consumer
protection scenario, the universe of consumers and vendors is virtually
mutually exclusive."' In the world of high finance and funds transfers, in
contrast, sizeable, experienced financial institutions populate both the
"user" and "provider" categories. Citi, Morgan, BNP, and DIK are service
users (ie., originators or beneficiaries) when they buy and sell financial
instruments amongst themselves and settle their resulting payment
obligations by funds transfers. In other instances, they provide funds
transfer services (i.e., they act as the originator's bank,"° an intermedi-
ary bank,"' or a beneficiary's bank1 ) and thus receive and execute
payment orders for the users.
IV. THE INVERTED PYRAMID
A. The Macroeconomic Purpose of Funds Transfer Law
A finds transfer law should primarily serve the financial markets,
specifically the interests of the players in those markets. The foreign
exchange markets, short-term money markets, interbank lending markets,
corporate securities markets, and derivative products markets are the
laboratories for testing funds transfer law.' The macroeconomic goals
may be effective even if the rule conflicts with this Article and indirectly affects another
party to the funds transfer who does not consent to the rule." Id. § 4A-501(b) (emphasis
added). In fact, a funds transfer system rule can even govern banks that do not participate
in the system. See id. § 4A-501(b).
107 See generally JOHN M. CARTWRIGHT, UNEQUAL BARGAINING (1991) (disussing
bargaining positions during the contract formation process).
'O Id.
1- u.C.c. § 4A-104(d) (1990) (stating that the originator, if it is a bank, is also the
originator's bank).
no See supra note 104.
See supra note 50; infra note 168.
11 Conspicuously absent from this list is the market for U.S. government securities.
These book-entry securities, maintained in the accounts of depository institutions at a
Federal Reserve Bank, are delivered from a seller to a buyer simultaneously with the
payment from the buyer (delivery-versus-payment, or DVP). While the payment is made
through Fedwire, the transfer is not governed by U.C.C. Article 4A. It is a debit transfer
(wherein the securities seller initiates the payment instruction) and bears an electronic
type code distinct from "normal" Fedwire funds transfers. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.,
OPERATiNG CiRCJuLR No. 8, FUNDS TRANsms THROUGH FDWIvR 5 (rev. effective
Jin 1, 1991) [hereinafter OPERATING CIRCULAR No. 8]. See generally CENTRAL BANKS
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of funds transfer law should be to support the growth and development
of these domestic and international financial markets. Funds transfer law
should facilitate (1) growth in the volume of financial transactions and in
the size of each transaction and (2) the development of internationally
competitive financial centers."'
The underlying transaction that gives rise to a payment obligation
settled by a funds transfer is very likely to be a spot or forward foreign
exchange contract,"4 an investment in a short-term money market
OF TE GROUP OF TEN COUNuES AND SWIIZERLAND, BANK FOR INT'L SsrLEME
(BAsLy, SWITZERLAND), DEiVERY VERsus PAYMENT IN SECURITIES SEiTLa&ENT
SYSTEMS (Sept. 1992) (discussing the types and sources of financial risk in the clearing
and settlement of contracts for the purchase and sale of securities).
" Professor Spak's insightful argument that U.C.C. Article 4A is needed to provide
legal certainty given the increasing frequency and volume of wire transfer activity does
not go far enough. He rightly suggests that this activity is generated by changes in federal
banking law that "open up investment banking opportunities to the nation's commercial
banks heretofore barred under the Glass-Steagall Act," Michael I. Spak, The Case to be
Made for Proposed Artide 4A of the Unifonn Commercial Code: What's a Trillion
Dollars between Friends?I, 80 KY. L.J. 167, 168 (1990-91), but fails to explore the
specific financial activities that lead to wire transfers or to identify the interest groups
involved in such activities. "The Glass-Steagall Act is the popular name of the Banking
Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.)." Id. at 168 n.8. Professor Spak's reference to the Glass-Steagall Act is technically
misleading. The Act limits the extent to which commercial banks can underwrite and deal
in non-bank eligible securities as principals (principally, corporate debt and equity), yet
such underwriting and dealing activities are only one of several potential types of
financial transactions which give rise to funds transfers. Nothing in the Act restricts the
ability of commercial banks to trade foreign exchange, shrt-term money market
instruments, or to make and receive interbank loans, which, as discussed below, also
generate payment obligations that are settled by funds transfers.
1" In a foreign exchange transaction, each party promises to deliver a specified
amount of foreign exchange (not physical currency) to the other on an agreed date.
Deliveries are accomplished by funds transfers. Thus, the foreign exchange markets are
where bank credits denominated in different currencies are electronically delivered to
bank accounts designated by the trading parties or their settlements departments. See
generally ROGER M. KUBARYCH, FOREIGN EXcHANGE MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES
(Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. 1983) (discussing foreign exchange tansactions). Legally,
these bank credits are choses in action. The ratio of the amount of one currency delivered
against the receipt of the other currency is the exchange rate between the two currencies.
The date on which the transaction is entered into is the "trade date" (m. The date on
which delivery occurs is the "value date." For virtually all spot transactions, the value
date is two business days after the trade date, or T+2 ('T+2 settlemenf). For Canadian
dollar/U.S. dollar deals, the trade date is T+1 ('tomext," for "tomorrow next" or 'T+l
settlement"). In contrast, a forward foreign exchange transaction is one where the value
date is more than two business days after the trade date. See GRABBE, supra note 21, at
393, 399; KUBARYCH, supra, at 9-10.
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instrument, a purchase or sale of securities, or an interbank loan."'
Typically, the transactors are commercial and investment banks."" These
facts are critical to any proposed theory of funds transfer law. Specifical-
ly, with respect to foreign exchange transactions, payment obligations are
settled by funds transfers through CHIPS.17 Payment obligations arising
from purchases of some stocks, bonds, and government and government
agency issues involve funds transfers through Fedwire."' Efforts are
underway to expand the use of funds transfers for settling corporate stock
and bond transactions. 9 Funds transfers through Fedwire are used to
settle payment obligations arising from purchases and sales of Fed funds
and repos'" and payment obligations associated with commercial pa-
per.' Funds transfer law will better serve the players in the financial
n See generally KuRARYCH, sipra note 114 (discussing foreign exchange
transactions).
116 Sophisticated individual investors also transact in these markets. See, e.g., Salomon
Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 795 F. Supp. 768, 769-70 (E.D. Va. 1992) (portraying defendant
Tauber as a wealthy veteran of the over-the-counter foreign exchange options markets).
Of course, central banks intervene in the foreign exchange market to counter disorderly
market conditions. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., FEDPOmTS 44: FOREIGN EXCHANGE
INTERVENTION (Aug. 1988). See generally C. Edward Fletcher, 'Sophisticated Investors
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.. 1081, app. 1149-55 justfying
disparate treatment of sophisticated and unsophisticated investors on the grounds of
statutory intezpretation and the position of sophisticated investors).
17 GRABBF, supra note 21, at 75; KUBARYCH, supra note 114, at 36. Fedwire is
involved in that net positions at the end of the funds-transfer business day of CHIPS are
settled by Fedwire transfers to and from accounts of CHIPS settling participants.
PATRIuKIS, BAXTER & BHAIA, supra note 6, at 203-04.
.. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEI& PUROSES AND FUNCTIONS 109 (1984) [hereinafter PU OSES AND FUNCTIONS].
11 See infia note 146 (discussing the same-day funds settlement proposal of the
National Securities Clearing Corporation and the Depository Trust Company). It should
be noted that payment for some corporate and municipal securities is still made by means
of a next-day funds settlement system. This involves the use of cashiers or clearing bank
checks. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., STAFF STUDY No. 163:
CLEARANCE AND SETrhMvENT IN U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS, app. D, at 28-29 (Mar.
1992).1 P9ROSES AND FUNCTiONS, supra note 118, at 109. Indeed, it has been suggested
that the Fed funds and repo markets should be called "the markets for short-term
immediately available funds," Lucas et al., supra note 20, at 10, because both markets are
settled in "immediately available funds" (a temi refening to fids transfers through
Fedwire). d.
In DAVID M. WEISS, AFTER THE TRADE IS MADE: PROCESSING SECURNIES
TRANSACTIONS 214, 387 (1986); see also infra note 146 (discussing the same-day funds
settlement proposal of the National Securities Clearing Corporation and the Depository
Trust Company).
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markets if certain benefits flow from the operation of the key features of the
law. Players in the world of high finance will find that finds transfers are an
attractive means of settling payment obligations if they are rapid, cheap,
certain, secure, and entail minimal risks. Whether these benefits are
realized-and thus whether more and bigger trades in specific financial
markets can be accommodated-hinges critically on the rules established in a
funds transfer statute.
In addition to growth in the volume and amount of financial market
twansactions, an important macroeconomic goal is gaining or maintaining an
international competitive advantage as a financial center. Every developed or
emerging financial center can be conceived of in terms of the inverted
pyramid.' Why are certain financial centers such as Singapore attractive,
while other locations such as Bombay less so? What are the critical
ingredients in the recipe for developing the Shanghai Stock Exchange and
other such emerging markets? ' While there is more to obtaining an
international competitive advantage as a financial marketplace than a
supportive finds transfer law,' such a statute is needed to accommodate
large-value credit transfers used to settle obligations arising from financial
transactions.' Policy makers and financiers who seek to develop their
' See supra notes 6-35 and accompanying text.
See generaly ECONOICS DEP'T, BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA (KUALA LUMPUR),
MONEY AND BANmKING IN MALAYSIA 339-66 (3d ed. 1989) (describing characteristics of
the foreign exchange market in Malaysia); Hu YEBI, CHINA'S CAPITAL MARKET 69-74
(1993) (discussing problems in the development of a stock market in China).
' There are other factors outside of the pyramid, some of which are immutable.
Geographic location and the relative position in a time zone make London attrac-
tivo-trading hours in London overlap with both the New York and Tokyo markets. Within
the pyramid, slow and unreliable clearing and settlement mechanisms at the second level
inhibit the transfer of ownership claims among investors. For instance, the collapse of the
Taurus project for settling trades in uncertificated securities on the London Stock
Exchange (SE) has damaged the international prestige of the LSE. See After Taurus:
City Lessons, FIN. TMEs (London), Mar. 23, 1993, at 17; Taurus Done to Death, FIN.
TIm (London), Mar. 12, 1993, at 13. Inadequate custody arrangements have heretofore
precluded U.S. investment companies from directly investing in the Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock exchanges.
2 See PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN DEVELOPED ECONOMIES (Bruce Summers & Hans
Blommestein eds., forthcoming 1993) (on file with author). It is beyond the scope of this
Article to analyze the funds transfer laws of other countries in relation to the settlement
of financial transactions in those countries. For an excellent guide to the European large-
value electronic credit transfer systems used to settle payment obligations arising from
financial transactions denominated in European currencies and the European Currency
Unit ('ECU") (e.g., the U.K.'s Clearing House Automated Payments System, or CHAPS,
for sterling credit transfers and France's SAGITAIRE system for settling international
French franc transfers), see CodMrN op GovERNORs op THE CENT. BANKS op THE
1993-94]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
financial centers or preserve the global importance of those centers must pay
due regard to the speed, cost, security of; and risks associated with inds
transfers. They must appreciate that the legal regime governing funds transfers
determines, in part; these features.
The macroeconomic goals are most likely to be met where the critical
provisions of the law meet the interests of the players in the financial
markets. The typical approach to funds transfer services is to identify two
categories of interested parties: users and providers."' However, this
obfuscates the relationship between settling payment obligations arising
from financial market transactions and funds transfer law. Moreover, it
fails to account for the overall consistency of interests of the players in
the inverted pyramid with respect to flnds transfer law. The four-level
inverted pyramid '27 should be the analytic framework in which to
identify the relational positions of the players and their interests.
Traders-the top level of the inverted pyramid-require a statute that
fosters high speed transfers in order to minimize risk exposure and
maximize their ability to use funds credited to their accounts. Traders also
need a low-cost means of settling payment obligations that arise from
their actions in the markets for foreign exchange, short-term money
market instrunents, interbank lending, and securities. Otherwise, the thin
profit margins that sometimes characterize trading in these markets will
erode.'
MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMuNrTY, PAYMENT SYsTEMS IN EC
MEMBER STATES (Sept. 1992) [hereinafter PAYMENT SYSTu iN EC MEmER STATES].
Im See, for example, U.C.C. § 4A-102 cnt. 2 (1990), which notes that
[flunds transfers involve competing interests-those of the banks that provide
funds transfer services and the commercial and financial organizations that use
the services, as well as the public interest. These competing interests were
represented in the drafting process and they were thoroughly considered. The
rules that emerged represent a cmeful and delicate balancing of those interests
(emphasis added). Similarly, the UN. Model Law was negotiated among UNCITRAL
delegates from all over the world representing central banks, ministries of finance and
justice, and regional and international organizations. U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No.
17, at 2-4, U.N. Doc. A/47/17 (1992). A common approach in negotiating and drafting
the U.N. Model Law was to divide delegations along"'rro-opnumer' and "tno-bank'
lines. Id.
' See infra notes 139-211 and accompanying text.
12 Consider a short sale of one million Singapore dollars in the Singapore dollar/U.S.
dollar spot foreign exchange market, followed by a purchase of one million Singapore
dollars to cover the short sale. Assume that there are no brokerage or other transaction
costs, that the short sale price is 1.640 Singapore dollars per U.S. dollar, and that the
cover purchase price is 1.641 Singapore dollars per U.S. dollar. The profit on the
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Settlements departments, the second level, attempt to minimize
uncertainty arising in two contexts. First, the legal effect of using funds
transfers as a means of settling payment obligations must be clear.
Second, payment order processing and dealing with mishaps must be
routine.
Funds transfer systems, the third level, aim to preserve contractual
freedom for their system rules and implement risk-reduction schemes.
Innovation of this sort reduces potential losses arising from the settlement
failure of one or more system participants. In turn, reduced risk provides
a competitive advantage for one system over another.
Funds transfer law, the focus of the third proposition, is the base of
the inverted pyramid and must be. measured against the interests of the
players who populate the top three levels of the pyramid. Technical rules
on same-day execution,' consequential damage liability,'" receiver
finality,3 1  discharge," payment order processing," money-back
guarantee,'" and variation by agreement 35 should directly address
these interests."
The link between macroeconomic goals for financial markets and the
interests of financial market players should be clear: it is far easier to
meet the goals if funds transfer law pays attention to the interests of
financial market players. The logic behind this link is a modification of
the classic doctrine of Adam Smith "that if all seek to promote their self-
interest, the whole society prospers: 'He... neither intends to promote
the publick [sic] interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it... he
intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led
by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his
intention."' 37 If funds transfer law allows the players to enter into and
transaction is the difference between the short sale price (U.S. $609,756.10) and the cover
purchase price (U.S. $609,384.52), or just $371.58.
U.C.C. § 4A-301; U.N. MODEL LAW art. 11(1).
Do U.C.C. § 4A-305(c); U.N. MODEL LAW art. 18.
,3' U.C.C. § 4A-405(c). There is no receiver finality rule in the U.N. Model Law.
m U.C.C. § 4A-406; U.N. MODEL LAW art. 19.
U.C.C. §§ 4A-207, 4A-208; U.N. MODEL LAW arts. 8, 10.
L U.C.C. § 4A-402(c); U.N. MODEL LAW art 14.
'3 U.C.C. § 4A-501; U.N. MODEL LAW art. 4.
1m It is beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate the extent to which each of these
rules satisfies the interests of the relevant financial market players. This critical analysis
is performed in a companion article. See Bhala, sipra note 8.
'37 TODD G. BucnOLZ, NEW IDEAS FROM DEAD ECONOMISTS: AN INTRODUCTION
TO MODERN ECONOMIC THOUGHT 21-22 (1990) (quoting ADAM SMrTH, 1 AN INQUIRY
INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 456 (R.H. Campbell et al.
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complete financial market deals more quickly, at lower cost, with greater
certainty, and with less risk, then the players' interests are met. In turn,
the players will be able to engage in a greater number of transactions in
a shorter period of time, and the average transaction will be larger. As a
result, the financial markets will grow and prosper and funds transfer law
will act--at best-as a visible hand promoting this end or-at worst-will
not stand in the way of increased financial market activity. Thus, the first
step to understanding the importance of funds transfer law must begin
with an analysis of each interest group.
B. Moving within the Inverted Pyramid
Movement from the top through the third level deliberately corre-
sponds with the chronology of events in a financial market transac-
tion." First, the traders agree to a deal, which generates a payment
obligation. If foreign exchange is traded, then each party is obligated to
render timely delivery of currency to the other. If the deal is the purchase
of a short-term money market instrument or a security, then the payment
obligation is the timely delivery of the required consideration. If the deal
is an interbank loan, then the payment obligations are effectively the
disbursement of the loan and its subsequent repayment.
Second, the transaction is cleared and arrangements are made for the
settlement of the payment obligations associated with the trade. These
operations comprise level two of the inverted pyramid. Interestingly, the
players at the top and second level are employed by the same financial
institution (a commercial or investment bank), and that institution is a
participant in one or more funds transfer systems.
Through a funds transfer, payment obligations are settled. The funds
transfer is -conducted via a particular funds transfer system such as
Fedwire or CHIPS. This is the third level of the inverted pyramid.
Although the players and systems do not necessarily have the same
interests regarding a funds transfer law, their interests tend to be broadly
consistent. Funds transfer law should thus support all three levels above
it in the inverted pyramid.
eds., 1976)).
13' See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFCE, CLEARANCE AND SmrT.nmEN REFORM: TE
STOCK, OPTONS, AND Mum MARKETS ARE STLL AT RISK 10-14 (Apr. 1990) (Pub.
GAOIGGD-90-33) [hereinafter 1990 GAO REPORT].
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1. The Traders' Interests: High Speed and Low Cost
The players at the top level are the traders employed by commercial
banks, securities firms, and other financial institutions.139 Theirs is a
twenty-four-hour world of telephones, computer terminals, and portable
electronic quotation devices for which a funds transfer law that ensures
high speed transfers at low cost is needed. Traders buy and sell foreign
exchange, stocks, bonds, commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, and Fed
funds, engage in repos and reverse repos, and place and receive certifi-
cates of deposit and Eurodollar deposits.
These financial market deals give rise to a payment obligation of the
buyer to the seller, which is settled through a fimds transfer.' There-
-9 The term "traders" is used to focus attention on principals trading for the account
of their institutions. Brokers are involved (e.g., in obtaining a counterparty for a seller of
Malaysian ringgit or a counterparty for a buyer of stock in a Thai company), but they add
a layer of factual complexity (and transaction costs) that does not alter the significance
of funds transfer law. For a general introduction to the role of the trader, see DAVID M.
WEISS, TRADERS: THE JOBS, THE PRODUCTS, THE MARKETS (1990).
140 See spra notes 6-35 and accompanying text. There are two caveats to this
discussion. First, not every payment obligation in every financial instnunmnt is settled by
a funds transfer. To take an extreme case, an investor buying stock on the Bombay Stock
Exchange does not pay for its shares with a funds transfer. However, funds transfer law
must anticipate the potential interest among financial transactors to settle their payment
obligations over the wires. The recent same-day funds settlement proposal of the National
Securities Clearing Corporation ('NSCC") and the Depository Trust Company ("DTC"),
infra note 146 and accompanying text, is a case in point A less extreme example is
trading in, derivative instruments. Typically, futures contracts are settled by offsetting
transactions. ROBERT E. FINK & ROBERT B. FEDuNIAx, FuTuRES TRADING: CONCEPrs
AD STRATEGIES 48 (1988).
Second, not every payment obligation arising from a securities purchase and settled
electronically is a funds transfer. Purchases of U.S. government securities are paid for
through electronic means, but the payments are not governed by funds transfer law.
Transactions in these securities are conducted through the Federal Reserve's book-entry
system on a delivery-versus-payment ("DVP") basis. Payment for a purchased Treasury
security is made by debit entry to an account maintained at a Federal Reserve Bank and,
simultaneously, the purchase's securities account is credited for the amount of the
securities. The payment side of these book-entry securities transactions is not governed
by U.C.C. Article 4A or Regulation J, in part because the payment instructions are not
'"payment orders" under the relevant operating circular. See OPERATING CIRMUAR No.
8, mpra note 112, at 5 (listing the type codes for messages that are "payment orders").
Conceptually, the payments side of a DVP transaction is a debit transfer insofar as the
securities seller (the payee) is instructing payment Debit transfers are not governed by
U.C.C. Article 4A. See Prefatory Note, supra note 48, at ii U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(1)
(defining '"payment order" to exclude debit transfers).
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fore, a funds transfer typically bears an integral relationship not to a
small-dollar retail or consumer transaction in goods-these are usually
paid for with cash, check, credit or debit card-but rather to a large-dollar
financial market deal."' Payment obligations arising from foreign
exchange transactions are customarily settled by funds transfer."
Similarly, trading in money market instruments, including certificates of
deposit, bankers' acceptances, and some municipal government securities
involves funds transfers. This is because "[b]roker-dealers instruct their
respective clearing banks to deliver the appropriate securities physically
and make payment, usually through Fedwire."'" Purchases and sales of
corporate securities-stocks and bonds-are cleared and settled through a
clearing organization, such as the National Securities Clearing Corpora-
tion, and an associated depository that retains physical custody of the
securities, such as the Depository Trust Company." Payments for
many of these securities are made in next-day clearing house funds. 4"
However, payments for some corporate securities, such as commercial
paper, are made by funds transfer and efforts are already underway to
expand the types of securities for which payment is made by fimds
transfer.'"
141 Prefatory Note, supra note 48, at i ("Payments that are covered by Article 4A are
overwhelmingly between business or financial institutions.").
'42 See GRABBE, supra note 21, at 75-76. Buyers and sellers of foreign currency
maintain accounts with each other or with correspondent banks for purposes of receiving
and delivering foreign exchange. Id. To be a player in the foreign exchange market,
maintaining an accouit in every currency in which trading is conducted is necessary.
143 PAYMENT SYSTEMS, supra note 98, at 225.
" Id. at 226; see supra notes 6-35 and accompanying text.
141 PAYMENT SYSTEMS, supra note 98, at 226.
146 For instance, the current DTCINSCC system for settling transactions in common
stocks, preferred stocks, corporate and municipal bonds, unit investment trusts, and
warrants is a next-day finds settlement system. Memorandum from the Depository Trust
Company and National Securities Clearing Corporation to Users and Interested Parties Re:
Same-Day Funds Settlement System Conversion, at 5 (July 26, 1993) (on file with
author). An NSCC member or DTC participant that owes money to NSCC or DTC as a
result of a securities transaction pays by certified check. If NSCC or DTC owes money,
payment is made by draft. The certified checks and drafts clear in one day. Id. at 5-6.
NSCC and DTC propose to switch to a same-day funds settlement system whereby all
payments to or from members and participants arising from securities transactions would
be made by finds transfers through Fedwire. Id. at 1, 5-6. Such a "same-day funds
settlement system" currently is offered by NSCC and DTC only for commercial paper
trades. Id. at 5.
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Two factors justify the traders' interest in a funds transfer law that
promotes high speed transfers: minimizing credit risk and maximizing
funds availability. "Funds transfer services are used primarily by
depository institutions and their corporate customers to make very large
time-critical dollar payments."147 With respect to credit risk, unless
delivery is made against payment, one party assumes the risk of default
of the counterparty. Where delivery of foreign exchange or a financial
instrument occurs before payment, the seller-payee assumes the credit risk
of the buyer. The more quickly payment is received, the shorter the credit
risk exposure. The failure of Herstatt after U.S. dollars were credited to
its account, but before it had delivered foreign exchange to its
counterparty, illustrates that exposure for even a few hours entails
potentially disastrous consequences.'"
With regard to funds availability, delays in settling payment
obligations impede rapid responses to changing market conditions and
may be costly.49 Traders are not long-term investors. Their positions
147 PAYMENT SYSTEMS, supra note 98, at 219-20.
14 See Delbreck & Co. v. Mamfacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F.2d 1047, 1049-50
(2d Cir. 1979); see also supra notes 73-87 and accompanying text (discussing Delbrueck).
Indeed, the immediate past President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
highlighted intra-day credit risks and argued that the payments system is a means of
extending credit, akin to traditional bank lending.
An economic system and a financial system can only be as efficient and as safe
as its payments system. In turn, the efficiency and safety of the payments
system rests importantly on the extent to which the maker or recipient of a
payment for a good, a service, or a financial transaction has confidence that the
payment can and will be honored since this process-by its very nature-entails
timing gaps of varying lengths. In turn, these timing gaps necessarily imply that
the process ofmaking and receiving payment is the process of extending credit,
even if that credit is extended only for a day or an hour. In short, the payments
system as we know it today is a credit system.
PATRIUIS, BAXIER & BHAIA, sipra note 6, at 211 (quoting E. GERALD CORRIGAN,
FBIANCIAL MARKET STRUcTuRE: A LONGER ViEw (1987)). Corrigan's point isthat parties
to financial transactions send and receive payments instrtions for millions or billions
of dollars and are at risk when there is a gap between funds paid out and funds received.
If payment obligations are not satisfied on time, then the chain of cmsequent defaults can
cause the financial system to crumble. The parties are more likely to proceed in spite of
these gaps if they have confidence in the health of the payments system, of which the
applicable legal framework is a significant determinant
149 .Overdraft charges are one such cost. Ifatrader has committed funds obtained from
deal 1 to deal 2 before receiving final settlement in deal 1, then an overdraft fee may be
charged. For the first time the Federal Reserve has implemented such charges on an intra-
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in foreign exchange, securities, or money-market instruments turn over
rapidly as new profitable trading opportunities are seized. Thus, funds
from a previous transaction must be available for deployment in a new
transaction.
The following covered interest arbitrage transaction illustrates the
point." Suppose on Day One a foreign exchange trader observes that
short-term interest rates in India are higher than those in the United States
and that the discount of the thirty-day forward '51 rupee/dollar rate
relative to the spot rupee/dollar rate is insufficient to eliminate a
profitable interest arbitrage opportunity. Accordingly, on Day One she
buys rupees for dollars in the spot market, invests the rupees for thirty
days in India, and buys dollars for rupees in the forward market. She
must have confidence that the rupees will be delivered on the spot value
date, which would be Day Three so that they can be invested immediately
for one month, at the end of which the forward contract matures and the
rupees must be converted back into dollars. The arbitrage opportunity
depends on compliance with exact delivery schedules.'52
What rules in a funds transfer statute facilitate high speed transfers?
A same-day settlement convention, coupled with rules that facilitate high-
volume, electronic processing of payment orders, are critical elements of
the law in this regard.
The same-day funds settlement convention is found in U.C.C. Article
4A and indirectly in the U.N. Model Law. Section 4A-301(b) of the
Uniform Commercial Code indicates that unless a payment order states
otherwise, the day on which a receiving bank must execute the order is
day basis. Modification of the Payments System Risk Reduction Program; Daylight
Overdraft Pricing, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,084 (Oct. 14, 1992) (effective Apr. 14, 1994);
Modification of the Payments System Risk Reduction Program; Measurement of Daylight
Overdrafts, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,093 (Oct. 14, 1992) (effective Oct. 14, 1993).
1- See generally GUNTER DU11EY & IAN H. GIDDY, THE INTERNATIONAL MONEY
MARKET 61-71 (1978) (studying the relationship between foreign exchange markets and
Eurocurrency interest rates).
"' A forward foreign exchange contract is virtually identical to a spot foreign
contract, supra note 36, except that the date fixed for delivery of the underlying
currencies is more than two days (and generally between one week and two years) from
the date of the contract
152 Note that while exchange rates are notorious for quick and dramatic movements,
the need for rapid delivery is not premised on such movements. The rate at which a spot
or forward deal is made is established on the trade date, not the value date. DuEY &
GIDDY, supra note 150, at 63.
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the day that the order is received.' Article Eleven of the U.N. Model
Law does not strictly require the receiving bank to execute a payment
order on the day of receipt.TM However, if it executes on a later date,
then it must give value as of the date of receipt..5 In practice, this is
likely to mean that a receiving bank that receives an order on Day One
but executes on Day Two must pass one day's interest on to the next
party in the fimds transfer chain.
Rules that encourage rapid payment order processing are more pro-
nounced in U.C.C. Article 4A than the U.N. Model Law. Whereas Article
4A unequivocally relieves the duty of a receiving bank to manually check
a payment order for discrepancies between account names (described in
words) and account numbers (described in figures), the U.N. Model Law
does not provide this relief." The nature and scope of a receiving
bank's duties with respect to handling payment orders are less clear under
the U.N. Model Law than under U.C.C. Article 4A. Accordingly, a
receiving bank is more likely to incur liability for wrongfully processing
a payment order that contains a discrepancy if the bank is subject to the
U.N. Model Law. This is at odds with the traders' interest in high-speed
funds transfers, as receiving banks may be forced to manually check for
discrepancies.
However, a fast payments mechanism is not enough for the traders,
as they need a low-cost mechanism as well. The price of settling a
transaction can wipe out the slim profit margin on which the trader
sometimes operates. The spread between a purchase and subsequent sale
of ten million pounds against U.S. dollars may be only one-tenth of a
1 U.C.C. § 4A-301(b) (1990).
U N. MODEL LAW art. 11(1).
... Id. art. 11(2).
" Compare U.C.C. §§ 4A-207(b)(1), 4A-208(b)(1) (beneficiary's bank or receiving
bank may rely on the account number, as there is no duty to determine whether name and
number match) with U.N. MODEL LAW arts. 8, 10(4) (requiring notice when discrepancies
are found by receiving bank or beneficiary's bank). Article 8 of the U.N. Model Law,
unlike U.C.C. § 4A-208(b)(1), makes no reference to misdescriptions of an intermediary
bank or beneficiary's bank. Thus, areceiving bank operating under U.C.C. § 4A-208(b)(1)
clearly has no duty to detect misdescriptions. Article 8(4) of the U.N. Model Law, by
contrast4 speaks of insufficient information in a payment order, but does not plainly spell
out the bank's duties in detecting discrepancies. Article 10(4) indicates that when a
beneficiary's bank detects an inconsistency, it must take corrective measures, but it does
not indicate whether the bank has a duty to check for inconsistencies. In contrast, U.C.C.
§ 4A-207(b)(1) does not impose such a duty.
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cent, and the spread between a sale and subsequent purchase of commer-
cial paper may be only one-half of a basis point.Y
Liability rules in funds transfer statutes address the traders' interest in
low cost. Legal liabilities are impediments in that the more onerous the
liabilities are on banks which provide finds transfer services, the more
likely that banks will increase the fees for these services."s Increased
fees, in turn, represent increased transaction costs. U.C.C. Article 4A is
more successful at delimiting the liabilities of receiving banks. Conse-
quential damages are generally not recoverable unless the bank agrees in
writing to assume such liability.'59 In contrast, the U.N. Model Law
allows for any remedies provided by any applicable law where a
receiving bank fails to execute a payment order or improperly executes
the order, if the bank acted with specific intent to cause loss or acted
recklessly and with knowledge that loss would result."6
2. The Settlements Department's Interest:
Certainty Manifested in Four Ways
Traders communicate the terms of their deal, including payment
instructions, to their respective settlements departments (commonly
referred to as "back offices"), which then confirm the terms and
conditions of the deal. For example, the practice in the spot and forward
foreign exchange markets and the over-the-counter, foreign exchange
options market is that the deal is negotiated and concluded by telephone
and confirmed in writing by the back offices of the trading parties.6 '
15 One basis point is 0.01 percent. NORMAN D. MOORE, DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS
FINANCE & INVENr 35 (lib. ed. 1975).
"l Theoretically, this is not the only possible economic response. It is conceivable
that competition could cause banks to deliver the same service at the same cost with
lower risk.
" U.C.C. § 4A-305(c).
'
6D U.N. MODEL LAW art. 18.
' See, e.g., Raj Bhala, Preliminary Summary of Findings of Survey on Foreign
Exchange Trading Practices (Jan. 26, 1993) (on file with author) (sunmarizing foreign
exchange trading practices for nine European countries, Japan, and Australia); Lawyers
Group of the Foreign Exchange Committee, International Foreign Exchange Master
Agreement (1993) (on file with author) (used for spot and forward foreign exchange
contracts); British Bankers' Association and Foreign Exchange Committee, International
Currency Options Market (ICOM) Master Agreement and Guide (Apr. 1992) [hereina e
ICOM Agreement].
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Without a routine system for clearing" and settling" each trade,
trading activity would grind to a halt. The back office of the bank that
employs the trader formulates and executes clearing and settlement
1 Clearing refers to "the process whereby the trades are compared, matched, and
confirmed." Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotfability: A New Model for Transfer
and Pledge ofInterests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REV.
305, 316 (1990). It involves "capturing the trade data, comparing the buyer's and seller's
version of the data, and guaranteeing that the trade will settle once the data match" 1990
GAO REPORT, supra note 138, at 10.
1 Settlement "is the process whereby parties to trades fulfill their obligations
thereunder-generally a 'delivery' of the securities [or, in the case of a foreign exchange
deal, the appropriate foreign exchange] by the seller and payment of the agreed price by
the buyer." Mooney, supra note 162, at 316-17 (citations omitted). Settlement involves
the exchange of funds and/or financial instruments between the trading parties: "Ihose
who owe money and/or financial instruments make payments or deliveries. Those who
are owed money and/or securities receive the funds or securities." 1990 GAO REPORT,
supra note 138, at 10. Using the term "settlement' in the second level of the inverted
pyramid raises the issue of whether there is an overlap between the second and third
levels of the pyramid. The second level involves clearing, settlement, and custody matters.
The focus is on confirming a transaction, payment instructions, and the transfer of
ownership claims to financial instruments. In contrast, the third level involves funds
transfers--he focus is squarely on the electronic transfer of bank credit, but this level
pertains to a specific means of settling a payment obligation (a funds transfer) and a
specific funds transfer system (Fedwire or CHIPS). "Settlement" as used in the context
of the second level is generic. It includes payment methods such as cash, negotiable
instrument, letter of credit, and funds transfer, which are all conceivable means of
settlement, even though funds transfers may be the most commonly used method and/or
the most significant in terms of the volume of financial transactions settled. For instance,
payment for some securities, such as book-entry U.S. Treasury securities, is made through
delivery-versus-payment. In other words, the electronic delivery of the securities and the
electronic transfer of funds occur simultaneously. Alternatively, other securities, such as
some of those that are cleared through the NSCC and held in custody at the DTC, may
be paid for by cashier's check. At the second level of the pyramid there is no distinction
between these alternatives. By contrast, at the third level of the pyramid, only one method
of settlement and the law that governs it is seen: a funds transfer.
The justification for distinguishing the second and third levels in this manne is, in
part, a practical one. Funds transfers, in terms of the volume of payments transactions and
amount of dollars, are enormously more significant than other means of payment. See
PAYMENT SYSTERs, supra note 98, at 215-25. Everyday, payment obligations arising from
millions of transactions representing billions of dollars are satisfied through funds
transfers. Anecdotal evidence also explains the distinction. Considerable effort is
expended by financial institution supervisors, namely the Federal Reserve, on matters
pertaining to funds transfers. The important role played by Federal Reserve representatives
in drafting U.C.C. Article 4A and the U.N. Model Law illustrates the perceived
importance of funds transfer law. See U.C.C. § 4A-102 cmt. (1990) (presenting a general
drafting history of Article 4A).
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processes.'" Because these must accommodate with precision a high
volume of trades in short periods, certainty is valued in a funds transfer
law in four ways: payment order processing, finality of payment,
discharge, and interloper fraud prevention."5 Remember that in each
instance, the back office (or more correctly, the financial institution of
which the back office is a part) acts as a receiving bank in a funds
transfer.16
The traders' back office demands certainty or, more specifically,
routine and predictability. To accommodate- growth in trading activity, the
back office must be capable of processing a large number of instructions
relating to the payment obligations arising from large financial transac-
tions in a short time period. Every time a trader buys foreign exchange,
short-term money market instruments, or corporate securities, or makes
or repays an interbank loan, the trader instructs her back office to
'- Mom generally, the players at the second level of the inverted pyramid are
clearing, settlement, and custodial facilities of banks. They range from the back office of
the trader's financial institution to sophisticated clearing, settlement, and depository
facilities in which several institutions participate. Because the focus of this Article is on
settling payment obligations and not on the mechanisms for transferring ownership claims
to specific financial instruments or on the custody of those instruments, the sophisticated
facilities are not highlighted. See generally EGON GUnMAN, MODERN SECURITES
TRANSFERS (3d ed. 1989) (discussing all aspects of the law of securities transfers);
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Property, Credit, and Regulation Meet Information Technology:
Clearance and Settlement in the Securities Markets, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131,
135-39 (1992) (describing the clearing and settlement process in U.S. securities markets).
Among the principal U.S. clearing and settlement systems for financial instruments are
the NSCC (corporate equities), the Options Clearing Corporation (options contracts), and
the Board of Trade Clearing Corporation (futures contracts). See 1990 GAO REPORT,
supra note 138, at 12-14 (stock, options, and fitures transactions). The Federal Reserve's
book-entry system is the clearing, settlement, and custodial facility for U.S. Treasury
obligations. See FED. REsERvE BANK OF N.Y., PEDPIOT"S 5: BooK-ENnY PRocEDURE
(Oct. 1986). Among the principal offshore facilities are FX NET (through which
participants bilaterally net their spot and forward foreign exchange trades for the same
currency and value date) and Euroclear and Cedel (the depository and settlement
organizations for the long-term international bond market and. the short-term Euro-nate
market). See PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN EC MEMBER STATES, supra note 125, at 294-95.
6 See infra notes 167-83 and accompanying text. This is not to suggest that the value
of certainty is unimportant in laws governing other payment mechanisms. Indeed, U.C.C.
§ 1-102 (1990) suggests that the U.C.C. should be 'liberally construed and applied to
promote its underlying purposes and policies." Id. Certainty is a relevant consideration
of interested parties in check processing See, e.g., id. §§ 4-301 to 4-303 (relating to
check collection and payor banks). However, because funds transfers are used to settle
large financial transactions in a short period of time, certainty takes on distinct
manifestations and meanings in the context of fimds transfers.
'6 See smpra note 71 (defining "receiving bank").
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generate a payment order to send funds to the trading counterparty. Every
time the trader sells in one of these markets or receives repayment of an
interbank loan, the back office is instructed to receive funds from the
trading counterparty. In addition, the back office may be an intermediary
between two trading parties neither of which is employed by the same
institution. For example, the Bank of Baroda in India may buy U.S.
dollars in exchange for Indian rupees through Westpac Bank in Australia
in a spot foreign exchange transaction and the transfer of dollars may be
routed through Security Pacific Bank in Los Angeles ("SecPac"). While
no trader at SecPac is involved in the dollar/rupee deal, SecPac's back
office, or funds transfer department, is involved in facilitating its
execution. In all of these cases, the back office must efficiently handle the
mishaps that sometimes occur in a funds transfer, such as a misdescrip-
tion of a party in a payment order or an incomplete funds transfer.
To properly route a payment order, a receiving bank must know the
party in the funds transfer chain to which the order should be sent. This
party, either an intermediary bank," the beneficiary's bank,1 or the
beneficiary, 69 is frequently described in the payment order in two
ways: by account name (described in words) and account number
(described in figures). The sender of the order might describe the party
inconsistently. For example, the sender may tell the receiving bank to
send the order to "Citibank" whose account number is 12345 when, in
fact, Citibank's number is 12346.
U.C.C. Article 4A allows a receiving bank to rely on the numerical
description of an intermediary bank, the beneficiary's bank, and/or the
beneficiary contained in a payment order when routing the order, even if
there is an inconsistent description in words provided the receiving bank
is unaware of the inconsistency.170 Moreover, the receiving bank has no
duty to check for inconsistencies.17" ' In effect, the back office can
process payment orders based on account numbers without worrying
about potential inconsistencies. The U.N. Model Law is far less clear on
these points. It does not unequivocally remove the burden of checking for
167 see swa note 104 (defining 'ntermediary banle.
'6 The "beneficiary's banki' is '"ie bank identified in a payment order in which an
account of the beneficiary is to be credited pursuant to the order." U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(3);
see supra notes 100, 113 and accompanying text.
See supra note 50 (defining "1neficiary").
"'Id. § 4A-207(b)(1) (concerning an inconsistency in a payment order between the
account name and number describing the beneficiary); id. § 4A-208(b)(1) (concerning an
inconsistency in a payment order between the account name and number describing the
internediary bank or beneficiary's bank where the sender of the order is a bank).
171 U.C.C. § 4A-208(b)(1).
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inconsistencies from receiving banks, nor does it clearly state that they
are entitled to rely on account numbers instead of account names in
payment orders." Accordingly, in this area, the U.N. Model Law does
not afford the same degree of certainty to receiving banks.
Processing payment orders is not the only context in which certainty
is valued. When the back office is receiving funds on behalf of a trader
or the bank, finality of payment is important-such as when a trader
informs her back office that funds will be sent by a counterparty as a
result of a sale by the trader to the counterparty of foreign exchange,
short-term money market instruments, or corporate securities. Finality of
payment is also important when the trader expects to receive repayment
of a short-term interbank loan previously extended to the counterparty.
The back office, as well as the trader or bank, must know when funds
credited to an account maintained or used by the trader or her bank are
final and irrevocable, because only then are the funds available without
reservation.
The receiver finality rule of U.C.C. Article 4A directly addresses this
problem. Once the beneficiary's bank has paid the beneficiary, the
payment is final. Payment by the beneficiary's bank to the beneficiary
cannot be made provisionally or subject to a right to recover payment
from the beneficiary." Payment occurs when the beneficiary's bank
credits the beneficiary's bank account and notifies the beneficiary of the
right to withdraw the credit.' In stark contrast, the U.N. Model Law"
does not contain a receiver finality rule. Therefore, a back office
receiving funds in a funds transfer subject to the U.N. Model Law is not
provided with certainty on the matter of finality of payment.
The need for certainty is also manifest when discharge becomes an
issue during the transfer of funds by the back office. The back office
needs to know when the payment obligation that spawns the funds
transfer is discharged. Only then does liability for payment based on the
underlying financial contract end. This concern will arise when, for
example, a trader instructs the back office to pay funds to a counterparty
as a result of purchasing foreign exchange, a short-term money market
instrument, or corporate securities from the counterparty, or when the
trader is extending or repaying a short-term interbank obligation.
'72 See U.N. MODEL LAW arts. 8 (containing obligation of a receiving bank other than
the beneficiary's bank); id. art. 10 (containing obligations of beneficiary's bank).
1 U.C.C. § 4A-405(c).
'
7 Id. § 4A-405(a). Payment also occurs when the beneficiary's bank credits the
account of the beneficiary and then "lawfully applies the credit to a debt of the
beneficiary," id., or otherwise makes funds available to the beneficiary. Id.
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Both the U.C.C. and the U.N. Model Law contain a rule on dis-
charge, and the rules are substantively similar."5 Upon acceptance of
a payment order by the beneficiary's bank on behalf of the beneficiary,
the finds transfer is completed' 7 and the originator's underlying
obligation to pay funds to the beneficiary is discharged. Acceptance by
the beneficiary's bank and payment to the beneficiary are closely linked
in that payment occurs when the bank accepts an order for the benefit of
the beneficiary.'"
The converse to the discharge rules is the money-back guarantee. 7
There must be an answer to the problem of incomplete transfers, which
occur when the beneficiary's bank does not, for whatever reason, accept
a payment order on behalf of the beneficiary. Both statutes attempt to
address the matter by assuring each sender in the funds transfer chain that
it will obtain a refund, with interest, of any payment made for a payment
order.17 9
The final manifestation of the back office's need for certainty is the
prevention of interloper fraud. This arises when the back office is
instructed to send a payment order on behalf of a trader as a result of a
financial market transaction entered into by the trader. A threat exists that
a wrongdoer will instruct the back office to issue a payment order in the
name of a trader or the trader's institution, and the wrongdoer might be
an employee of the institution. The back office must be able to discern
bona fide payment orders from unauthorized and fraudulent orders.
The U.C.C. and the U.N. Model Law rules on interloper fraud should
be seen in the light of the interests of the back office." Both statutes
implement the concept of a ."commercially reasonable'.' security
procedure that is designed to test the authenticity of payment orders
received.' The general rule is that if a receiving bank and sender agree
to such a procedure and the bank follows it, then the sender is liable for
... U.C.C. § 4A-406; U.N. MODEL LAW art. 19.
U.C.C. § 4A-104(a); U.N. MODEL LAW art. 19(1).
177 U.C.C. § 4A-406(a); U.N. MODEL LAw art. 9(1)(d).
'7 U.C.C. § 4A-402(d); U.N. MODEL LAW art. 14(1).
' A limited exception applies in cases where a sender designated tbe use of a
particular mtenediary bank that subsequently failed. Such a sender is not entitled to the
money-back guarantee. It bears the risk of loss arising from the collapse of a bank that
it selected. U.C.C. § 4A-402(e); U.N. MODEL LAw art. 14(3).
110 U.C.C. §§ 4A-201 to 4A-203; U.N. MODEL LAW art. 5. These intricate rules ame
explained in detail in PATRIS, BAXTE & BHALA, supra note 6, at 39-51 (U.C.C. art.
4A rules); id. at 272-75 (U.N. Model Law rules).
.' U.N. MODEL LAw art. 5(2)(a).
'= U.C.C. §§ 4A-201, 4A-203; U.N. MODEL LAW art. 5.
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any payment order issued in its name and accepted in accordance with the
procedure, even if the order was sent by a wrongdoer.18 Because the
procedure must be "commercially reasonable" in order to absolve the
receiving bank of liability, there is some uncertainty as to whether a court
would hold that a particular procedure meets this standard. However,
industry custom and practice (i.e., the nature of the security procedures
used by other receiving banks) may afford greater certainty to receiving
banks.
3. The Funds Transfer System's Interest:
Reducing Systemic Risk
The vast sums transferred daily over the principal funds transfer
networks are associated with wholesale transactions among sophisticated
financial institutions. ' The existence and importance of funds transfer
systems derive largely from the use of funds transfers as a method of
payment in a broad range of domestic and international financial market
transactions.1" After the trader has entered into a financial deal and
communicated a payment instruction to her back office, that office sends
or receives payment orders from other banks via a particular funds
transfer system. If U.S. dollars are transferred, then the Fedwire or CHIPS
systems will most likely be used.'"
Membership and participation in these systems is comprised of many
of the same financial institutions, namely, banks, that employ traders and
settlements personneL'" The member-participants have a critical
collective interest: reducing systemic risk. Specifically, the credit risk
1.. U.C.C. § 4A-203; U.N. MODEL LAW art. 5.
18 See supra notes 6-35 and accompanying text
... See szqra notes 6-35, 45-111 and accompanying text. With respect to the two
princpal U.S. funds tansfer systems:
Fedwire is used principally for domestic payments, while over 70 percent
of CHIPS payments are dollar-denominated international payments. For
example, Fedwire is used for interbank overnight loans, interbank settlement
transactions, corporate-to-corporate payments, and settlement of security
transactions. In contrast, CHIPS is used to settle foreign exchange transactions
and Eurodollar placements.
PAYMENT SYsTEMs, supra note 98, at 220 (emphasis added).
1 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
iIt should be noted that securities finns, which obviously have trading and
settlements functions, do not have direct access to Fedwire (Le., they do not participate
in Fedwire) and very few are CHIPS participants. See infra note 188 (discussing access
to Fedwire).
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associated with one participant should not become a systemic risk
problem. Participants in a funds transfer system-commercial banks and
other depository institutions"1 -are legitimately concerned about the
ability of each net debtor participant in the system to settle its payment
obligations at or before the end of the funds transfer business day."19 If
one or a few net debtors fail, then this should not cause liquidity
problems for, or insolvencies ot other participants:
The increased interdependence of the securities markets and the various
payment systems, coupled with the globalization of the securities
markets, raises the issue of the growing danger of systemic risk in
payment systems. This is the risk that one or more participants in a
payment system will be unable to meet their obligations when due and
thus cause other participants to be subsequently unable to meet theirs.
Of the various kinds of risk to which banks may become exposed
through the accelerated use of the new technology, it is this systemic
risk that is the greatest cause for concern."
Settlement guarantees are one way of assuring that the system closes
each day with all creditors' payments claims satisfied. Through a
payments netting scheme, 9 a second technique, the risk of a settlement
' Under the Monetary Control Act of 1980, "depository institutions" (Dis") are
allowed access to Fedwire. 12 U.S.C. § 248(o) (1980). There are thousands of DIs with
on-line direct computer access to Fedwire and many smaller Dis with off-line access. See
PAT~imS, BAXTER & BHALA, supra note 6, at 11, 184. There are 122 CHIPS participants,
including many of the world's largest banks. Id. at 11; PAYMENT SYSTEMS, supra note 98,
at 224.
119 The 'Tunds transfer business day" of a receiving bank is the part of the day during
which it is open to receive, process, and transmit payment orders, as well as cancellations
and amendments thereof. U.C.C. § 4A-105(a)(4). CHIPS is a same-day funds settlement
system where settlement occurs at the end of the day on the books of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York on the basis of multilateral netting of payment obligations. See supra
note 12. Multilateral netting refers to "a netting system in which direct participants settle
only their net net positions resulting from the clearing process." PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN
EC MEM3ER STATES, supra note 125, at 326. Fedwire is a same-day funds settlement
system where settlement occurs instantaneously. See supra note 11. A net debtor
participant ina system is one who, as aresult of payment orders sent and received during
the day that are netted on a bilateral or multilateral basis, has a net payment obligation
to its counterparty (under a bilateral netting anangement) or to the system (under a
multilateral netting anrangement). See PATRIKS, BAXTER & BHALA, supra note 6, parts
III-IV (explaining CHIPS and Fedwire operations); see also LAMALUSSY REPORT, supra
note 84 (reviewing netting schemes).
PAYMENT SYSTEMS, supra note 98, at 2-3.
1 Netting is a complicated and rapidly evolving topic. The single most important
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failure of one participant in a funds transfer system causing a chain
reaction of liquidity crises and failures of other participants is reduced,
assuming that there is receiver finality." Players in the financial
markets who understand that they can net payment obligations on a
bilateral or multilateral basis with their counterparties will appreciate that
larger volumes of trading activity and larger transaction values can be
safely accommodated. The risk of non-payment by a counterparty will not
rise in proportion to the credit exposure to that counterparty if a netting
scheme is implemented. Credit exposure will depend on the number of
trades and the amount of each trade executed with the counterparty. The
number of settlement transactions arising from the trades will be reduced
by fifty percent if a bilateral netting scheme is implemented '93 and by
eighty percent if multilateral netting is used."5' Settlement risk is
reduced because the number and amount of funds transfers is reduced
through netting. In sum, assuming financial market players operate
rationally and with substantial information, they are likely to internalize
reductions in systemic risk."9 In turn, the macroeconomic purpose of
fostering growth and development in financial markets will be served.
For pragmatic reasons, systemic risk reduction is shared by the bank
regulators, principally the Federal Reserve, that examine the participants
and the system. Regulators are a hidden interest group in the third level
of the pyramid. They understandably want to avoid a major settlement
failure that would necessitate a bail out. If a participant cannot settle a
large net debit position, then the ripple effect of this failure could weaken
that participant's counterparties, who were relying on the settlement to
fund their payment obligations. As the "lender of last resort," the Federal
Reserve could be called upon to provide liquidity to the net debtor
participant and/or its counterparties to limit the systemic repercus-
sions."
source of information and guidance for central bankers and other policy makers remains
the .,AMALUSsY REPORT, supra note 84.
't In other words, assuming that net settlement payments are final.
93 Id. 2.4, at 11.
L Id. 2.12, at 13.
Assume that an individual player that has sold foreign exchange or a financial
instrument observes that receipt of final payment by funds transfer is essentially
guaranteed because of abnormal settlement rules such as those in CHIPS Rule 13. See
CHIPS RULES, supra note 12, at 4-11. From that player's perspective, the guarantee is
intemalized in that it becomes an incentive to choose a funds transfer over other means
of payment. See generaly Coleman, supra note 54, at 221, 231-32 (defining external
effects and extemalities).
' As the lender of last resort, as well as a regulator of many CHIPS and all Fedwire
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Financial institutions that cooperate to form and participate in a funds
transfer system lay down rules for entry and participation."9 The
relationship between these rules and funds transfer law is of critical
interest to the participants. First, funds transfer law must recognize the
existence of flmds transfer systems and their rules. Funds transfer
legislation that neglects these systems and rules ignores the reality of the
funds transfer market. Second, the law should address what Professor
Scott has dubbed the "third party problem'" 9-to what extent, if any,
can system rules bind non-participants? Third, and most important, funds
transfer law should support the efforts of system participants to minimize
systemic risk by allowing system rules to vary inconsistent provisions in
the law. For instance, CHIPS participants have agreed to net payment
obligations on a multilateral basis and to provide collateral and settlement
guarantees to minimize systemic risk.'" However, these privately
negotiated rules are useful only if they are not undermined by specific
rules in U.C.C. Article 4A or the U.N. Model Law. A rigid receiver
finality rule, which back offices might favor, might discourage the
development of abnormal settlement procedures. Similarly, efforts to
expand the use of netting in foreign exchange markets through master
agreements that call for netting or through new central clearing and
settlement facilities20' require the support of funds transfer law at least
in the form of an ability to vary inconsistent provisions by agreement.
The status of funds transfer system rules under U.C.C. Article 4A is
relatively clear in that each provision of the statute is variable by a funds
transfer system rule, unless the contrary is indicated.2 2 The rule may
be effective even if it indirectly affects a non-consenting party. 3 It
may directly govern the rights and obligations of parties other than the
participants, the Federal Reserve's discount window would be a critical source of liquidity
for a failing participant in a fimds transfer system. See 12 C.F.R. § 201.1-.110 (1993)
(relating to discount window operations). To the extent that the system can contain the
adverse effects of failure, emergency lending operations are unnecessary.
' See, e.g., CHIPS RuLES, spra note 12; PATRS, BAXTER & BHALA, smqra note
6, part IV.
'" HAL S. SCOTr, NEW PAYMENT SYSTEMS: A REPORT TO THE 3-4-8 COMMrrTEE OF
TE PERMANENT EDrrORIAI BOARD FOR TE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 40 (1978).
9 CHIPS RULES, supra note 12, at 12-13 (Rule 15).
For an example of such a master agreement see ICOM Agreement, supra note
161.
2" See PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN EC MEMBER STATES, supra note 125, at 294
(discussing the Exchange Clearing House Organization ("ECHO")).
21" U.C.C. § 4A-501(b) (1990).2M Id.
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financial institutions that participate in the funds transfer system if such
parties are given notice of the use of the system to effect the transfer and
the system's rules.2 The status of a funds transfer system rule is not
as clear under the U.N. Model Law as under U.C.C. Article 4A. The term
"funds transfer system rule" is hardly ever used in the U.N. Model
Law,2 ' as "funds transfer systems" are not discussed. While many of
the U.N. Model Law articles are variable by agreement,' ° the U.N.
Model Law does not indicate whether rules promulgated by a funds
transfer system constitute an "agreement" for this purpose.
The ability to opt out of a provision in a funds transfer statute may
serve a secondary purpose for system participants: competitive advantage.
Because the U.S. funds transfer market is dominated by Fedwire and
CHIPS, it is tempting to characterize these providers of wholesale wire
transfer services as natural monopolies.0 7 Arguably, there is competi-
tion between the two giants, in which case system rules are a competitive
variable. Like any other private sector business, a funds transfer system
must remain competitive and profitable. CHIPS, owned and operated by
commercial banks, competes directly with Fedwire for the funds transfer
business generated by trading activity in the foreign exchange markets,
short-term money markets, and securities markets.2° Both are essential-
ly privately organized systems that operate under the auspices of
applicable funds transfer law.2°
: Id. §§ 4A-501(b), 4A-507(c).
20 U.N. MODEL LAW art. 6(b)(iv)(a) (concerning bilateral and multilateral netting and
the identification of when payment is made). This is the only instance where the term is
used.
20 Id. art. 4.
' See, e.g., Scorr, supra note 198, at 35-36 ('Wire transfer is highly concentrated
in ... Fedwire."). A natural monopolist is a producer for which unit costs decline at
every level of output (i.e., there are economies of scale in production); thus a larger
producer can sell at a lower price than a smaller producer. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS
ULEN, LAW AND ECONOICS 97 (1988).
m CHIPS and Fedwire are "funds transfer systems" under U.C.C. § 4A-105(a)(5),
though Fedwire is accorded somewhat unique treatment under the statute. See U.C.C. §
4A-105 cnt. 3.
' Fedwire cannot be considered a government service in the classic sense because
the Federal Reserve Banks that own and operate Fedwire are instrumentalities of an
independent federal agency providing a private service-the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System. Nor does Fedwire pose externality problems associated with
public goods, because only depository institutions that sign written agreements with their
local Reserve Bank can send and receive payment orders directly to and from Reserve
Banks. See, e.g., OPERATING CIRCULAR No. 8, supra note 112, at 1. A public good is
one 'for which there is no rivalry in consumption and for which the costs to a private
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Viewed in this way, there is a consistency between the competitive
interests of a funds transfer system on the one hand and the interests of
traders and their back offices on the other. Competitive advantage is gained
by one system over another in part by providing faster, cheaper, and more
secure means of transferring bank credit, all of which appeal to traders and/or
their back offices. In addition, one system can gain a competitive advantage
by offering rules that more effectively reduce systemic risk.
CONCLUSION
What is the purpose of the new and complex body of funds transfer law?
This Article argues that the law should serve the interests of three distinct
players in the financial markets: the traders and back offices of major
commercial and investment banks, as well as the funds transfer systems used
by these banks. Funds transfer law is neither a backstop to private agreement
nor a response to the common law. Consumer protection is an equally
unsatisfying justification. Funds transfer law and domestic and international
financial markets are inextricably linked because wire transfers are commonly
used to settle payment obligations arising from financial market deals. Funds
transfer law must not be seen in a vacuum, and financial market growth and
development must not be viewed as the province of securities regulation,
banking law, and commodity law. A concern for the health of domestic and
international financial markets necessitates a concern for funds transfer law.
Checks as a means of settling payment obligations in the markets for
foreign exchange, short-term money market instruments, interbank lending,
corporate securities, and derivative products cannot satisfy the interests of the
players. Traders require a high-speed, low-cost means of settlement. They
seek high-speed transfers in order to maximize availability of funds and
minimize credit risk, and low cost in order to preserve slim profit margins.
Rules on same-day execution andpayment orderprocessing potentially satisfy
their interest in high speed, while limitations on the liability of receiving
banks for consequential damages potentially satisfy their interest in keeping
funds transfer service costs low.
The concerns of settlements departments include certainty in handling
payment orders, finality of payment (i.e., when funds received are irrevoca-
ble), and discharge (i.e., when an obligation is legally paid). Rules on
payment order processing, receiver finality, discharge, and a money-back
supplier of excluding nan-paying beneficiaries are high." COOTER & ULEN, supra note
207, at 108. Securities firs me among the potential rivals for consumption of Fedwire
services. Under the Monetary Control Act of 1980, Reserve Banks are able to exclude
non-depository institutions. 12 U.S.C. § 248(o) (1980).
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guarantee potentially satisfy these interests. The back office also is at the
battlefront against interloper fraud, and legally sanctioned security
procedures that efficiently allocate risk are critical. Fraud prevention rules
must address these interests.
The commercial and investment banks that participate in and utilize
a funds transfer system have a shared interest in lowering systemic risk
Their efforts are aided if funds transfer law is variable by agreement A
funds transfer statute should accommodate this interest by allowing the
system's members to engage in binding risk-reduction efforts. This,
however, involves trade-offs between flexibility on the one hand and risk-
fixing and economies of scale on the other.
The ultimate success of wire transfer law hinges critically on whether
specific rules actually satisfy the interests they should be designed to
serve. The inverted pyramid is only as strong as the foundation on which
it rests. In turn, robust financial market development is dependent in part
on the satisfaction of the interests of these key players. If settling
payment obligations is a slow, costly, uncertain, and risky process, then
financial market transactions will be stymied. The ultimate aim of a funds
transfer statute must be to promote larger trading volumes and larger
transaction sizes in the markets for foreign exchange, short-term
instruments, corporate securities, derivative products, and interbank
lending. Achieving this aim depends primarily on the law governing the
settlement of payment obligations generated in these markets.
The next step for scholarly research is to test the theory of funds
transfer law articulated hereim2 The argument that funds transfer law
should primarily serve the financial markets must be applied to specific
provisions of U.C.C. Article 4A and the U.N. Model Law. The extent to
which the law satisfies the interests of traders, back offices, and funds
transfer systems could be gauged by using microeconomic and banking
tools to critically analyze the relationship of the base of the inverted
pyramid to the delineated interests of the players in each of the upper
three levels .21 A complete framework for assessing this fascinating new
body of law will then exist.
210 See Bhala, supra note 8.
n1 This is not to suggest that there is a single proper way to explore the link between
funds transfer law and financial market growth and development. Empirical research is
one avenue. Surveying securities, derivatives, foreign exchange traders, their back offices,
and their lawyers is certainly one agreeable method for examining whether the U.
Model Law will firmly support the inverted pyramid. The approach here is to use the
laboratory-i.e., to develop a hypothetical transaction and analyze the interests of the key
players.
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